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
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# MACV SEER REPORT.

A SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RVNAF

## PART I

ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN),  
VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS (VNMC),  
VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN)

1ST QTR, CY 70 [u]

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1. This report is prepared quarterly to provide COMUSMACV, MACV staff agencies and advisors with an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).
2. The content of the USMACV SEER Report is derived from operational statistics and responses to quarterly questionnaires submitted by senior advisors as a part of the MACV System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER). This part of the report contains ARVN/VNMC and VNN evaluations. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) portion of this report is published under separate cover as Part II.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
1 USMACV SEER Report, Part I,  
1st Qtr CY 70

*Ronald A. Hall*  
RONALD A. HALL  
CPT, USA  
Asst AG

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PART I: ARVN/VMMC AND VNN FORCES

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1. (U-FOUO) INTRODUCTION.

a. Coverage. This report addresses the operational effectiveness of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNNC), the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) during 1st Qtr CY 70. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) portion of the report is published as Part II. The status and performance of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) are covered in separate reports, the most comprehensive of which is the MACCORDS Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) Monthly Evaluation Summary Report.

b. Data and Information Sources.

(1) General. Operational statistics are derived from the SEER Monthly Operational Statistics Reports submitted to MACV by US advisors assigned to ARVN/VNNC units. Significant problem areas are reported quarterly by corps senior advisors. Assessments of operational effectiveness, leadership, training, staff functions and problem areas of ARVN and VNNC units are derived from advisors' responses to the SEER quarterly questionnaire. Enemy force strength data is obtained from MACJ2. Friendly force strength data is received from MACJ3 and the Territorial Forces Evaluation System. Input for the naval forces portion of this report is received from the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, and the Senior Naval Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy, in the form of monthly and quarterly reports.

(2) Revised MACV SEER Questionnaire. This questionnaire was completely revised in late 1969 and provides a greater range of information for evaluating important areas of command interest in ARVN/VNNC effectiveness. In addition, the new questionnaire now has specific questions answered by advisors at all basic command levels (infantry and artillery battalion, regiment, brigade, division and corps). During the developmental stages, various field organizations were contacted for assistance and their recommendations incorporated into the final questionnaire. The new questionnaire was implemented on a test basis during the fourth quarter 1969 reporting period, providing an overlap of old and new data bases, and allowing the old and new results to be directly compared. The new questionnaire provides a more precise measurement of many attributes of ARVN/VNNC units covered by the old questionnaire, as well as expanded coverage into areas previously not considered. Hence, the evaluations derived from the two questionnaires are not identical, and those trend lines displayed in this report which cover several quarters may have a discontinuity in the fourth quarter. Likewise, the fourth quarter evaluations shown on charts derived from the questionnaire are not those displayed in 4th Qtr CY 69 MACV SEER Report, but have been derived from the new questionnaire.

c. Factors Influencing Performance. Many factors, such as differences in terrain, size of areas, enemy/friendly density, level of activity, weather, and tactics employed by opposing forces affect the results as shown in this report.

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2. (C-NOFORN) SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE.

a. Effectiveness.

(1) Allocation of Effort. The level of effort devoted to combat operations increased to 61 percent, an all-time high for the past two years. Time spent on security remained about the same as the previous quarter, at 21 percent. Effort devoted to pacification has steadily decreased as a result of JCS's emphasis on turning this mission over to territorial forces. There was a two percent decrease in time spent on reserve, training and rehabilitation, however.

(2) Contacts and Enemy Initiated Incidents. Country-wide enemy contacts by ARVN infantry battalions increased from 1,843 in the 4th Qtr CY 69 to 1,979 during the first quarter. The number of contacts with enemy units of platoon size and smaller increased ten percent, while battalion size contacts dropped sharply from the previous period. The major decrease occurred in II Corps, which reported no battalion size contacts during the quarter. There was a decrease in the number of enemy initiated incidents against ARVN/VNMC units during the quarter; as has been the trend over the past five quarters. Night time incidents continue to constitute the major percentage of all incidents.

(3) Operational Results. Results during the first quarter in terms of enemy eliminated increased and was the best achieved since 2d Qtr CY 69, while the number of friendly KIA, declined. I Corps organizations achieved the greatest number of enemy KIA per standard battalion among the corps and the 2d Division was highest in-country in this category. Ranger battalions showed the greatest improvement in enemy KIA during the quarter. The number of weapons captured per battalion increased, and the weapons ratio more than doubled from the previous quarter, as the number of weapons lost by friendly forces decreased by 50 percent. The ARVN maneuver battalion kill ratio reached a new high at 5.4:1. Cache finds of weapons increased five percent, while the amount of food and ammunition increased 50 percent; the largest amount since 2d Qtr CY 69. The Airborne Division accounted for 29 percent of the total cache finds.

(4) Effectiveness. US Advisors' assessment of ARVN/VNMC operational effectiveness increased from the previous quarter, with III Corps units showing the largest overall gain. I Corps organizations have been rated high for the past five quarters, as have some special units (Airborne and Marines).

(5) Training. The total time spent on training by ARVN battalions decreased slightly from the fourth quarter and remains low. The quality of training showed improvement during the first quarter with almost all categories receiving a smaller percentage of "poor" ratings from advisors than in the fourth quarter. An accelerated program to provide refresher training is planned, but twenty percent of the ARVN infantry battalions will be overdue for this training by the end of the year.

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(6) Unit Performance. Highlighted during the quarter as top performance units were the 25th, 9th, 1st and 2d Divisions, and the Airborne, and Marine special units.

b. Problem Areas.

(1) Leadership. The quality of leadership has generally improved during the quarter, but continues to be weak among lower ranking officers and noncommissioned officers. Specialized leadership courses at division training centers and increased numbers of small unit operations are serving to correct this deficiency. This problem reveals itself in many ways, the most serious of which is the lack of aggressiveness demonstrated by many organizations. During the first quarter, 12 percent of the battalion advisors reported that their units were not aggressive when in contact with the enemy. The overall ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalion leadership assessment has improved slightly during the first quarter. The leadership problem continues to be reported as greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(2) Maneuver Battalion Strength. The ARVN and VNMC expanded slightly during the first quarter, but maneuver battalions continued to be understrength. The assigned strength of ARVN infantry battalions increased by 2,500 during the first quarter, but lagged behind authorized levels, which also increased by 4,100 on 1 January 1970. The shortage in maneuver units amounts to a deficit of approximately 22 infantry battalions. The country-wide desertion rate of ARVN/VNMC major combat elements, which increased in the fourth quarter, decreased slightly in the first quarter to 30 per 1,000 assigned strength. Although the overall RVNAF desertion rate is much lower, the high rate in combat units continues to present a significant problem.

(3) Casualties due to Mines and Booby Traps. In the first quarter deaths from mines and booby traps increased, and since total friendly KIA decreased, the percent of total casualties due to mines and booby traps increased to 36 percent, which was the highest percentage in the last five quarters.

(4) Logistics. The ARVN supply system, especially the portion dealing with the requisitioning and distributing of supplies and repair parts, remains a critical problem. Failure to properly exercise the supply system has led to shortages of parts for mission essential items at the using unit level, while an adequate supply of these parts is reported to be available in-country. The quality and quantity of dependent housing continues to be a major problem, although some progress has been made. Some items, such as M60 machine guns, grenade launchers, 3/4 ton and 1 ton trucks, remain in short supply. Experience gained in the recent turnover of bases to ARVN units has indicated the need for substantial improvement of ARVN base maintenance support.

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(5) Training. Extra attention is still needed on all aspects of training so that maximum qualitative improvement in ARVN/VNMC forces can be realized. Advisors report that the analysis of the training situation by division, regimental and battalion G3/S3 sections and the training programs they develop and implement have shown substantial improvement this quarter, but still remain major problems. Some gradual improvement is indicated in the quality of in-place training, but the amount of such training has decreased since the fourth quarter. The overall training effectiveness evaluation has slightly improved this quarter.

(6) Inadequacies within Division, Regimental and Battalion Staffs. A substantial number of advisors report G2/S2, G3/S3 and G4/S4 functions to be inadequate, with considerable improvement being reported in division/ regimental G3/S3 staff sections. A greater percentage of advisors report inadequacies within battalion staffs than in regimental and division staffs.

(7) Intelligence. ARVN battalions have displayed more effective efforts in collecting intelligence information this quarter, but the intelligence they received from higher headquarters was untimely much of the time. The intelligence functions at all staff levels are reported as a major staff problem.

(8) Unit Performance. The 42d Regiment and the 23d Division displayed relatively low performance during the quarter. The 42d Regiment continued to be hampered by poor employment and obtained minimal results.

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3. (C-NOPORN) ARMY AND MARINE FORCES EVALUATION.

a. Environmental Aspects. On the following pages are environmental conditions and characteristics for each corps. These conditions are considered important in analyzing results and performance of ARVN/VNMC units. Charts 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the average numbers of enemy and friendly maneuver battalions present in the DTA during the first quarter, relative strengths of enemy and friendly maneuver elements, and enemy and friendly density in each DTA. 1/ Friendly strengths are subdivided to show FWMAF, ARVN, and RF/PF-CIDG. Enemy strengths are subdivided to show NVA/VC infantry and guerrilla elements and are computed to include all enemy maneuver elements less headquarters. Arrows indicate previous quarter strengths.


1/ Maneuver battalions include ARVN armored cavalry squadrons.

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Chart 1

## **I CORPS FRIENDLY/ENEMY, DENSITY, STRENGTH, & NUMBER OF MANEUVER UNITS**



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**CONFIDENTIAL**I CORPS ENVIRONMENTCONDITIONSCHARACTERISTICS

## Terrain

The Chaine Annamitique Mountains dominate the area. Rain forests covering the mountains offer refuge to the enemy. In the west, the Chaine Annamitique grades into rolling upland plains, with altitudes between 1,500 and 3,000 feet above sea level. In the east, the mountains drop off sharply to narrow coastal plains.

## Weather

Throughout the quarter, the northermost corps area was dominated by poor to marginal weather more than 50% of the time. Ceilings below 2,000 feet and visibilities restricted by fog and light rain or drizzle were commonly observed. However, breakdowns in the northeast monsoon did produce periods of up to a week of good flying weather during the first two months. The beginning of the transition to the southwest monsoon during the latter half of March also brought about somewhat improved conditions over the corps.

## Population

The majority of the population of about 3,062,100 (17.3% of the national total) is settled along the coast. Da Nang and Hue are the only major cities in the area.

## GVN Control

Relatively secure: Hamlets 84.5%; Population 88.3%.

## Enemy Forces

TYPE OF UNIT	AVG NO. OF BNS	CHANGE IN AVG NO. OF BNS FROM LAST QTR
NVA	61	-2
VCMF	7	0
VCLF	7	0
Sappers	19	-2
	94	-4

The total enemy strength decreased about 11 percent from last quarter. The 11th DTA has the highest enemy density in-country.

## Friendly Forces


The total friendly strength remained about the same as 4th Qtr CY 69. CIDG strength of 3,611 has been included in the RF/PF totals this quarter. FWMAF decreased by seven battalions since last quarter reflecting the redeployment of US Marine forces. RF/PF and CIDG forces increased by 1,389 and ARVN/VNMC forces increased by 1,171.

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Chart. 2

**II CORPS**  
**FRIENDLY/ENEMY, DENSITY, STRENGTH, & NUMBER OF MANEUVER UNITS**



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## II CORPS ENVIRONMENT

CONDITIONSCHARACTERISTICS

## Terrain

The largest of the corps areas, II Corps, is characterized by diverse terrain features consisting of coastal plains, highland plateaus, mountains and dense jungles. The area is, for the most part, sparsely populated and underdeveloped.

## Weather

During January, coastal II Corps experienced a weather pattern similar to I Corps and the highlands were under generally good conditions. February produced somewhat improved conditions along the coast while the highlands experienced good flying weather 27 days during the month. During March, the coastal stretches were under partly cloudy skies except for occasional periods of rain shower activity. Light, widely scattered showers also appeared in the highlands for the first time this year.

## Population

The majority of the population of about 3,141,900 (17.7% of the national total) is settled along the coast. Qui Nhon and Nha Trang are the major cities of the coastal area. The population inland is largely Montagnard.

## GVN Control

Relatively secure: Hamlets 76.3%; Population 88.1%.

## Enemy Forces

<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>AVG NO. OF BNS</u>	<u>CHANGE IN AVG NO. OF BNS FROM LAST QTR</u>
NVA	24	+2
VCMF	4	0
VCLF	12	0
Sappers	10	+1
	50	+3

Although there was an increase of three enemy battalions, the total enemy strength decreased about 23 percent from last quarter. The 23d DTA continues to have the lowest enemy troop density of all the DTAs and STZs.

## Friendly Forces



The 23d DTA also has the lowest friendly troop density of all DTAs and STZs. There was an increase in the total friendly strength during the quarter. CIDG strength of 9,767 has been included in the RF/PF totals this quarter. The reduction in FMAF strength reflects the redeployment of US forces. RF/PF increased by 3,663 and ARVN/VNMC forces decreased by 854, and remained lowest of all corps.

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Chart 3

**III CORPS**  
**FRIENDLY/ENEMY/DENSITY, STRENGTH, & NUMBER OF MANEUVER UNITS**



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**CONFIDENTIAL****III CORPS ENVIRONMENT****CONDITIONS****CHARACTERISTICS**

**Terrain** The III Corps area is one of transition. The southern portion consists of rich, flat lands which flood during the rainy season. In the eastern regions, there are mangrove swamps, dense forests, and rubber plantations. In the northwestern areas the terrain becomes mountainous with elevations up to 1,500 feet.

**Weather** A basically good weather pattern persisted across the corps during the first quarter of 1970. Fog and haze caused brief periods of poor conditions during the early mornings but the afternoons generally provided good flying weather. Near the end of March, a slight increase in rain showers was noted in the area.

**Population** III Corps has the second largest population of about 5,571,400 (31.4% of the national total) and the national capital (Saigon) with a population of about 2,192,500.

**GVN Control** Relatively secure: Hamlets 92.7%; Population 96.8%.

<b>Enemy Forces</b>	<b>TYPE OF UNIT</b>	<b>AVG NO. OF BNS</b>	<b>CHANGE IN AVG NO. OF BNS FROM LAST QTR</b>
	NVA	32	-5
	VCMF	34	+1
	VCLF	6	0
	Sappers	16	+2
		88	-2


the total enemy strength decreased about 27 percent from last quarter although the total number of battalions only decreased by two.

**Friendly Forces** The total friendly strength remained about the same as 4th Qtr CY 69. CIDG strength of 5,924 is included in the RF/PF totals this quarter. FWMAF battalions decreased by 11 reflecting the redeployment of US forces. RF/PF and CIDG forces increased by 773 and ARVN/VNMC forces increased by 2,585.

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Chart 4



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IV CORPS ENVIRONMENTCONDITIONSCHARACTERISTICS

## Terrain

IV CTZ includes the Delta of the Bassac and Mekong Rivers. The area is covered almost entirely with swamps, marshes and rice fields. The shoreline is marked by long stretches of mangrove swamps, beyond which mud flats stretch for some distance at low tide. Nearly all of the Delta is less than 10 feet above sea level and the rise and fall of the tide is noticeable in the rivers and canals throughout the area. The unimproved areas of swamps, mangrove forest and jungle afford sanctuary to the enemy.

## Weather

Southern IV Corps experienced the same general weather pattern as III Corps. A good weather pattern persisted across the corps. In the early mornings and afternoons fog and haze caused brief periods of poor conditions but flying conditions were generally good.

## Population

IV Corps has the largest population area with about 5,948,200 (33.6% of the national total). The delta is the major farming area and producer of rice.

## GVN Control

Relatively secure: Hamlets 76.6%; Population 84.7%.

Enemy Forces	TYPE OF UNIT	AVG NO. OF BNS	CHANGE IN AVG NO. OF BNS FROM LAST QTR
	NVA	8	+5
	VCMF	18	-2
	VCLF	18	+2
	Sappers	9	<u>+4</u>
		53	+9

Although enemy battalions increased by nine, there was a 14 percent decrease in total enemy strength during the quarter. There was an increase in infiltration by NVA forces.

## Friendly Forces

The Tien Giang DTA (7th Division) continues to have the highest friendly troop density of all DTA's and STZ's. The total friendly strength increased by less than one percent from the last quarter. CIDG strength of 5,750 is included in the RF/PF total this quarter. One additional ARVN Marine battalion was deployed during the quarter. RF/PF and CIDG forces increased by 1,322 and ARVN strength increased by 395.

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## b. Enemy Initiated Incidents.

(1) There was a decrease in the number of enemy initiated incidents against ARVN/VNMC units during the quarter; as has been the trend over the past five quarters (Chart 5).

(2) Chart 6 illustrates the number and type of incidents directed against ARVN infantry units, by corps, during the last four quarters. Night-time incidents continue to constitute the major percentage of all incidents. Corps assessments are as follows:

(a) I Corps. I Corps experienced the least number of enemy initiated incidents among the four corps. Most of these incidents occurred during daylight hours. Incidents were about equally distributed between the two divisions and one separate regiment.


(b) II Corps. Although other types of incidents declined, assaults and ambushes remained at the same level as the previous quarter. The total number of incidents were highest among the four corps. Incidents in the 23d DTA accounted for 50 percent of the corps total and consisted mostly of attacks by fire. Night attacks comprised the majority of these incidents.

(c) III Corps. The total number of enemy initiated incidents decreased by more than 65 percent. Activity in the 31st and 32d DTA accounted for all of these incidents, most of which took place at night.

(d) IV Corps. The corps was second highest in the total number of enemy initiated incidents, which were equally distributed among the three divisions. The majority of incidents took place at night.

(3) Annex B contains a detailed tabulation of enemy initiated incidents.


Chart 5



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Chart 6



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**CONFIDENTIAL****c. Contacts.**

(1) Country-wide enemy contacts by ARVN infantry battalions increased from 1,843 in the 4th Qtr CY 69 to 1,979 during the first quarter (Chart 7). II Corps experienced the least number of contacts among the CTZs.


(2) The number of contacts with enemy units of platoon size and smaller increased ten percent from the last quarter. This denotes the enemy's increased reliance on the employment of small unit tactics throughout the battle area, as opposed to massing his forces into battalion-size operations, which increases their vulnerability to detection and annihilation by friendly forces.

(3) In contrast to the increase in platoon-size contacts country-wide, battalion-size contacts dropped sharply from the last quarter. The major decrease occurred in II Corps, which reported no battalion-size contacts during the quarter. In I Corps, an equal number of battalion-size contacts were reported by the 1st and 2d Divisions (eight each), while in III Corps only three such contacts were reported; all by the 18th Division. IV Corps reported 25 battalion-size contacts, 16 of which took place in the 42d DTA, in Choung Thien and An Xuyen Provinces.

(4) Annex A contains a detailed tabulation of enemy contacts and results.

Chart 7

ENEMY CONTACTS BY ARVN INF BNS



► PREVIOUS QTR

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d. Effort.

(1) Percent of Time Spent on Missions Country-wide. Chart 8 shows the average battalion effort on missions country-wide for ARVN/VNMC organizations, and trends since 1969. Effort devoted to combat operations increased to 61 percent, an all-time high for the two year period. Time spent on security remained about the same as the last quarter, at 21 percent. Effort devoted to pacification has steadily decreased as a result of JGS's emphasis on turning this mission over to territorial forces. II Corps continued to devote one-third of its time to pacification, although there was a decrease from the previous quarter. There was a two percent decrease in time spent on reserve, training and rehabilitation.

(2) Percent of Time Spent on Missions Within Each Corps. Chart 9 shows a comparison of time spent on each mission, with an indication of the change since last quarter.

(a) I Corps. Time spent on combat operations increased, although bad weather continued to restrict operations in the 11th DTA during the early part of the quarter. The 51st Regiment almost doubled its effort on combat operations but continued to devote 49 percent of its effort to security operations--second highest in-country. Very little time was devoted to pacification, as is prevalent with I Corps units. Time spent on reserve, training and rehabilitation increased slightly. The 2d Division continued to devote an above average amount of effort to training (nine percent) while the 1st Division and 51st Regiment were both below average in the amount of effort expended on this mission.

(b) II Corps. A large percentage of II Corps' effort was still devoted to static pacification and security (43 percent during the quarter), while time spent on combat operations decreased. JGS has directed the withdrawal of units of the 22d and 23d Divisions from pacification effort by the end of 2d Qtr CY 70; and efforts are being made by these organizations to meet this goal. The 42d Regiment continued to place emphasis on training during the quarter, devoting 11 percent of its time to this effort--highest in-country.

(c) III Corps. Time spent on combat operations increased for the sixth consecutive quarter and was highest in-country at 67 percent. The 5th Division recorded, for the second consecutive quarter, the most time on combat operations (79 percent) of all major organizations. As combat operations increased effort devoted to pacification declined. Time spent on reserve, training and rehabilitation decreased to eight percent, however, six percent, was devoted to training.

(d) IV Corps. Time spent on combat operations increased to 63 percent, while there was a corresponding decrease in security and pacification efforts. The 19 percent of time devoted to reserve training and rehabilitation was highest among the four corps. Seven percent of this time was devoted to training.

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Chart 8





Chart 9



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(3) Comparison of Time Spent on Missions by Major Organizations.  
The table below shows the major ARVN organizations with the most or least time spent on each mission. Complete data indicating time spent on each mission is contained in Annex C.

TABLE 1


<u>MISSION</u>	<u>MOST TIME</u>		<u>LEAST TIME</u>
Combat Operations	5th Div	(79%)	22d Div (7%)
Security	42d Regt	(51%)	9th Div (1%)
Pacification-Active	25th Div	(36%)	5th Div & 51st Regt (0%)
Pacification-Static	22d Div	(39%)	1st, 2d, 5th, 18th Div & 51st, 42d Regt (0%)
Reserve	2d Div	(10%)	42d Regt, 25th Div (0%)
Training	42d Regt	(11%)	2d Div (5%)
Rehabilitation	9th Div	(14%)	51st & 42d Regt (0%)

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
Chart 10

**COMBINED AND UNILATERAL OPERATIONS**




■ COMBINED OPNS  
■ UNILATERAL OPNS

Chart 11



■ COMBINED OPNS  
■ UNILATERAL OPNS

Chart 12



■ COMBINED OPNS  
■ UNILATERAL OPNS

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e. Combined and Unilateral Combat Operations.

(1) Effort (Chart 10).

(a) The proportion of time spent on combined (US and ARVN) combat operations decreased from the last quarter primarily due to the reduction of combined efforts in III Corps, which was caused by the redeployment of US units. However, the III Corps commander continues to emphasize the DONG TIEN (Progress Together) program in the 5th and 25th Divisions, and has gained considerable success.

(b) In I Corps approximately the same proportion of time was spent on combined and unilateral operations as in the previous quarter. The 51st Regiment spent almost 20 percent of its time on combined operations with US Marine Corps units.

(c) All combined operations conducted in II Corps during the quarter were recorded by the 23d Division elements working with US forces of Task Force South.

(d) Combined operations will continue to show a decrease in the future due to US force redeployments and the increasing desire of ARVN commanders to assume responsibility for their own areas of operation, with only US combat support provided.

(2) Results (Charts 11 and 12).

(a) In I Corps, the number of enemy KIA per battalion per day was higher on combined operations than the number achieved on unilateral operations. The kill ratio, however, was low. The 51st Regiment obtained 70 percent of its kills while on combined operations with US Marine Corps units.

(b) II Corps units produced negligible results on combined operations.

(c) In III Corps, results achieved were better per battalion day of effort than those achieved on unilateral operations. The 5th and 25th Divisions achieved excellent results in the number of enemy KIA per battalion day and kill ratio.

(d) Although the kill results from combined operations are not always impressive, advisors continue to report that many benefits are derived from these operations in terms of improving leadership, combat effectiveness and employment of combat support. Combined operations provide a vehicle for moving ARVN combat forces away from populated areas and into remote, high threat areas to operate against enemy main force units. The forward deployment of ARVN units helps in eventual redeployment of US forces.

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Chart 13





Chart 14



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
f. Results.

(1) Enemy Eliminated. Chart 13 shows the country-wide average battalion results achieved by ARVN/VNMC in terms of enemy eliminated (killed, captured and surrendered). In addition, friendly KIA is indicated; and the ratios of enemy to friendly KIA are also shown. The number of enemy eliminated increased and was the highest since 2d Qtr CY 69, while the number of friendly KIA declined. The kill ratio reached a new high at 5.4:1. The 2d, 9th and 25th Divisions had the largest number of enemy eliminated during the quarter. Chart 16 shows the enemy KIA figure per battalion for the corps and major organizations.

(2) Weapons Captured (Chart 14). The number of weapons captured (excluding caches) per battalion increased, and the weapons ratio more than doubled from the previous quarter, as the number of weapons lost by friendly forces decreased by 50 percent. The weapons ratio of 18.3:1 was the best achieved since 3d Qtr CY 69. The 2d and 9th Divisions captured the most weapons.

(3) US and GVN Regular Forces Kill Ratio. A comparison of US and GVN regular forces (ARVN/VNMC, VNAF and VNN) kill ratios, based on country-wide statistics (Measurement of Progress Data) is shown on Chart 15. Both US and GVN ratios decreased during the quarter, with the US ratio showing the greatest decline.


Chart 15



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Chart 16



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(4) Caches.

(a) Chart 17 indicates caches of weapons found by ARVN/VNMC organizations country-wide since 1st Qtr CY 69. Cache finds of weapons increased five percent during the quarter. The largest find of weapons was in III Corps by the Airborne Division.

(b) The food and ammunition found in caches is indicated by Chart 18. The amount of food and ammunition discovered increased by 50 percent, the largest amount since 2d Qtr CY 69. The 5th Division found 16 percent of all the ammunition while the Airborne Division found 28 percent of all the food. The Airborne Division continued to do very well in both categories by finding 29 percent of the total.

Chart 17

## CACHES





Chart 18



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Chart 19

AMBUSHES - KIA / STD BN





Chart 20

AMBUSHES



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(5) Ambushes.

(a) Chart 19 shows a comparison of corps results of friendly ambushes, in terms of enemy KIA per standard battalion, during CY 69 and 1st Qtr CY 70. Results increased in all four corps. I Corps obtained the greatest number of enemy KIA per standard battalion, for the fifth consecutive quarter. II Corps' results increased for the first time since 2d Qtr CY 69, due to the efforts of the 22d Division, but remained lowest among corps for the quarter. III Corps' results increased steadily throughout the 15 month period, and remained ARVN's second highest in the first quarter. The 25th Division was III Corps' best performer, accounting for 61 percent of the corps total kills by ambush. Results in IV Corps increased to 7.8 KIA per standard battalion. Although results achieved were below the ARVN average, they were the best attained by the corps during the 15 month period.

(b) Chart 20 depicts the number of ambushes conducted by organizations within each corps during the first quarter and results achieved in terms of enemy KIA per standard battalion.

1 I CTZ. The 2d Division achieved 316 kills by ambush during the quarter. This was the largest number of kills attained by any ARVN organization and represented 39 percent of the division's total kills for the period. The 1st Division conducted an above average number of ambushes but achieved below average results, while the number of ambushes conducted by the 51st Regiment were below average and the results achieved were about average.

2 II CTZ. The 22d Division conducted the 2d highest number of ambushes in-country and accounted for 76 percent of the corps 119 total kills; but its results, although the best in II Corps, were below the ARVN average. The 23d Division conducted almost 700 ambushes per standard battalion and achieved only 25 kills, while the 42d Regiment was lowest in-country in both the number of ambushes conducted and enemy kills.

3 III CTZ. The 25th Division conducted the largest number of ambushes in-country and achieved the second highest results. Thirty-four percent of the 5th Division's total kills for the quarter were by ambushes. The division conducted the third highest number of ambushes in-country but its results were below the ARVN average. The 18th Division was lowest among III Corps organizations both in the number of ambushes conducted and enemy KIA per standard battalion.

4 IV CTZ. IV Corps was lowest among corps in the number of ambushes conducted during the quarter. The 7th Division with relatively few ambushes achieved ARVN's third highest number of enemy kills per standard battalion (13.4). The 9th and 21st Divisions were below average in both the number of ambushes conducted and enemy kills.

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g. Combat Support.

(1) Country-wide. Chart 21 depicts combat support provided to the ARVN/VNMC battalions from 2d Qtr CY 69 through 1st Qtr CY 70, as reported by US advisors to ARVN battalions. There was a substantial increase in the amount of combat support provided ARVN/VNMC battalions in each category. Tactical air/gunship and helicopter/fixed wing lifts both increased 39 percent from the previous quarter. Artillery support also increased and was the greatest amount provided in over a year. There was a proportionate increase in the amount of support provided by RVNAF resources, with artillery support reaching a new high at 85 percent. Among ARVN/VNMC organizations, the Airborne Division was the greatest user of combat support during the quarter. The amount of tactical air/gunship and artillery support provided the airborne battalions was more than double that provided any other organization. The airborne battalions also used the greatest number of helicopter/fixed wing lifts and aerial resupply sorties. Among the ARVN infantry organizations, however, IV Corps battalions were provided the greatest amount of combat support during the period. Annex E provides complete combat support data for major organizations and a per battalion share for each organization.

(2) Chart 22 shows the combat support provided to the ARVN in each corps.

(a) I Corps. Combat support employed by I Corps battalions increased in each category, as shown by the chart. The percentage of artillery support provided by RVNAF decreased to 77 percent compared to 89 percent in the previous quarter. RVNAF provided 43 percent of the tactical air support, a substantial increase from the last quarter, and eight percent of the MEDEVAC. The 1st Division received the greatest amount of artillery support in I Corps and was the second highest user among ARVN infantry organizations. The 2d Division received the most helicopter lift support, and the 51st Regiment received the greatest amount of tactical air support; but utilized less artillery support than the other organizations.

(b) II Corps. There was a decrease in support provided II Corps battalions, which was the lowest of all corps in each category. RVNAF resources provided 90 percent of the artillery and 33 percent of the tactical air support, both of which represent a substantial increase from the previous quarter. RVNAF provided 14 percent of the helicopter lift sorties (a slight decrease) but did not fly any MEDEVAC missions. The 42d Regiment received the most helicopter lift and artillery support while the 23d Division utilized the greatest amount of tactical air support.

(c) III Corps. Combat support employed by III Corps battalions increased in each category except artillery support which decreased. The 5th Division employed the most artillery and was the greatest user of tactical air support. The 25th Division employed ARVN's second largest number of

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
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helicopter lift sorties, while the 18th Division was the lowest of the corps organizations in the use of all combat support, except artillery. RVNAF resources provided 76 percent of the artillery (a 15 percent increase), and 22 percent of the tactical air support. The percentage of artillery support provided by RVNAF remained lowest among the corps for the second consecutive quarter. Only one percent of the helicopter lift and four percent of the MEDEVAC support was provided by RVNAF.

(d) IV Corps. Combat support provided IV Corps battalions showed a substantial increase in all categories. The amount of artillery, helicopter lift and MEDEVAC support provided was the greatest of all corps. RVNAF resources continued to provide 100 percent of the artillery support, while providing 65 percent of the tactical air and 35 percent of the helicopter lift support. Three percent of the MEDEVAC support was provided by RVNAF. The 9th Division was highest among ARVN infantry organizations in the use of helicopter lift, MEDEVAC and artillery support, while the 21st Division employed ARVN's second highest amount of tactical air support.

Chart 21

**COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED  
ARVN/VNMC (PER BN)**




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Chart 22

**COMBAT SUPPORT PROVIDED ARVN INF (PER BN)**



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
h. Operational Effectiveness Assessments.

(1) The country-wide average of advisors' assessment of operational effectiveness rose for the fifth consecutive quarter. Chart 23 shows the trend in the ARVN/VNMC average since the first quarter 1969. The discontinuity in the fourth quarter was caused by a change in evaluations given some ARVN units by advisors in the revised SEER Quarterly Questionnaire.

(2) Significant factors in the first quarter increase were the improved assessments awarded to the 5th, 18th and 21st Divisions, and the 42d and 51st Regiments as shown by Chart 24. The percent of increase in the 42d Regiment's assessment was highest in country, but the organization still ranked lowest in ARVN. Several units showed regression during the quarter, among which were the 2d, 9th and 23d Divisions. The 9th continued to rank among ARVN's top divisions, but the 2d Division, one of ARVN's top divisions in the fourth quarter, dropped to below average due to a change in the advisors' assessment of the 6th Regiment. Among ARVN special organizations, the ranger units showed a significant increase, while the airborne and Marine units dropped off. Advisors' assessment of Marine units, however, remained highest in-country.

(3) Annex D contains detailed assessment tables derived from the questionnaire.


Chart 23



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Chart 24



▼ PREVIOUS QUARTER

NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69**CONFIDENTIAL**

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i. Division, Regiment and Battalion Staff Element Evaluations.

(1) Chart 25 compares the effectiveness of division and regimental staff functions among the four corps on a percentage scale and Chart 26 contains the same information for infantry battalion staffs. Responses to specific staff questions were grouped by functions (command and control, G1/S1, G2/S2, G3/S3, G4/S4) and ratings computed. The command and staff average column shows the combined ratings. A staff element such as G1/S1 can be compared between corps because advisors answered the same set of questions. Different staff elements cannot be directly compared because the ratings are based upon different sets of questions. The battalions have experienced greater difficulty in staff operations than divisions and regiments and are therefore portrayed separately. Staff element problem areas are analyzed by specific function in paragraph 4e.

(2) Regiments/Divisions (Chart 25). In the first quarter, I Corps staffs again received the highest overall rating, with no change from the previous quarter average. II Corps staffs were rated below average in each area but exhibited a substantial gain in the G1/S1 staff function from the previous quarter. III Corps staffs showed an increase in each category, and were below average in only the G2/S2 and G4/S4 staff functions. IV Corps was below average in each staff area except G4/S4, and showed an overall decline from the previous quarter.


(3) Infantry Battalions (Chart 26). I Corps battalion staffs showed a decline in each area from the previous quarter and their overall rating fell below average. II Corps staffs were highest in each category, with every function showing an increase from the fourth quarter. III Corps also increased in each area from the previous quarter, but was below average in the overall rating. IV Corps battalion staffs declined in each category except S4, and were below average for all staff areas.

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
Chart 25

**EVALUATION OF COMMAND & STAFF FUNCTIONS  
REGIMENTS/DIVISIONS**



NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69

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EVALUATION OF COMMAND & STAFF FUNCTIONS  
INFANTRY BATTALIONS

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**CONFIDENTIAL****j. Summary of ARVN Infantry Effectiveness Indicators.**

(1) ARVN's ten divisions and two separate regiments are depicted on Chart 27. The comparative standing of the organizations according to six selected indicators is shown. Organic reconnaissance companies and cavalry squadron results are included in totals. The chart does not consider all the ramifications involved in a total evaluation. The organization are considered in three groups (top/middle/bottom) in discussing their relationship on the chart.

(2) ARVN's four divisions in the top group during the 1st Qtr CY 70 were the 25th, 9th, 1st and 2d. The 25th has the highest enemy kill ratio and is above average in the five other effectiveness indicators. The 9th Division is above average in five of the six indicators and has the greatest number of enemy KIA per standard battalion in-country. The 1st Division was also above average in five of the six indicators, and had the highest assessment of operational effectiveness, as well as the highest weapons captured ratio per enemy eliminated; a distinction that it shared with the 5th Division. The 2d Division was above average in four of the six indicators, and was highest among ARVN organizations in weapons captured per standard battalion.

(3) ARVN's two organizations in the bottom group were the 42d Regiment and the 23d Division. The 42d Regiment was below average in all ARVN effectiveness indicators during the 1st quarter, and was in the bottom position in three of the six. The 23d Division was below average in five of the six indicators, achieving an above average status in only the ratio of weapons captured to enemy eliminated. The division was lowest in-country in enemy kill ratio.

(4) The other six ARVN organizations, the 5th, 7th, 18th, 21st and 22d Divisions and the 51st Regiment were in the middle group.

**k. Evaluation of Operational Effectiveness of Infantry Divisions, Separate Regiments and Special Organizations.**

(1) General. The foregoing evaluations were primarily at corps or country-wide level. In order to provide a more detailed evaluation of the operational effectiveness of ARVN and VNNC units, the following pages present charts and texts for each of the divisions, separate regiments and special organizations (airborne, ranger, armored cavalry and Marines). Organic reconnaissance companies and cavalry squadron results are not included in division totals.


(2) Techniques. The evaluations are based primarily on first quarter and yearly trends in operational performance data. For each organization's evaluation the discussion is organized in terms of environment, effort, combat support, results, operational effectiveness/leadership

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and trends. Enemy density is based on the total estimate of maneuver unit strength plus guerrilla strength. In order to compensate for substantial differences in the number of battalions in a division or regiment and in infantry battalion strengths, "standard battalion" figures are used for some indicators. The number of standard battalions per division is obtained by dividing the average quarterly strength of all the battalions of the division by the authorized strength of an ARVN infantry battalion.



(3) Charts. The evaluation of each organization is illustrated by charts containing combat support received, opportunity, results, and operational assessments. In addition, yearly trends are depicted for enemy eliminated, kill ratio, advisors' assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership, and percent of effort on all missions.

Chart 27



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Chart 28



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**1ST DIVISION**

Environment. The 1st Division's DTA has the largest enemy density in-country at 2.14 per square kilometer which includes the largest NVA density. The density includes enemy units in areas contiguous to Vietnam which move between Laos, the DMZ and Vietnam.

Effort. Most of the 1st Division's effort during the first quarter was spent on combat operations with a slight increase to approximately 75 percent. The reserve and rehabilitation time was above average at 8 percent, but training time was a low 3 percent.

Combat Support. All three of the combat support elements have increased. The number of artillery rounds fired being 3,500 per standard battalion. The relatively small increase in the number of helicopter lift sorties reflects the negative effect that bad weather had on operations in the mountain areas.

Results. The 1st Division's hours of contact increased but remained below average. Many of these contacts were small NVA units located in bunkers and caves. The number of enemy eliminated increased but is still below average at approximately 38 per standard battalion. A comparison between the number of enemy eliminated and the hours of contact indicates that over 3 enemy were eliminated for every hour of contact. Under normal conditions this ratio can be used as an aggressiveness indicator. The 1st Division is above average in this comparison with a 3.4:1 ratio. The number of weapons captured by the 1st Division increased and is above average at approximately 17 per standard battalion. A comparison between the number of weapons captured and the number of enemy eliminated shows that one weapon was captured for every 2.3 enemy eliminated. This was one of the better ratios in-country. Under normal conditions this ratio can also be used as an aggressiveness indicator. The kill ratio dropped but is still above the ARVN average at 6.1:1.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Although the large majority of the 1st Division's results were achieved by its 1st and 2d Regiments, the operational effectiveness of the entire division is still considered excellent.

Trends. The 1st Division has reversed its downward trend in the number of enemy eliminated. Its weapons captured trend is also increasing. Its kill ratio trend dropped due to losses from rockets and mortars. The trend in operational effectiveness is rising while the leadership assessment remains about the same as fourth quarter. The 1st Division's improved results should continue now that the monsoon season is over and the division can expand its operations.

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
Chart 29








◀ PREVIOUS QTR

— ARVN INF AVG

TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

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2D DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density in the 2d Division's area is down slightly as it was country-wide. The friendly density has increased as it has in a majority of the I Corps areas, due to increases in RF/PF strength.

Effort. The slight increase in offensive operations to 62 percent is part of the 2d Division's well balanced effort, which includes an above average percent of time on training (9 percent) and rehabilitation (14 percent). Their time on security was 14 percent.

Combat Support. The 2d Division's combat support increased with helicopter support showing the greatest increase. The 298 helicopter lift sorties reflect the extensive Eagle Flights used to reduce mine casualties.

Results. The 2d Division was able to achieve a well above average amount of contact, with a slightly below average amount of offensive effort. During their contacts the 2d Division's infantry battalions eliminated 102 enemy per standard battalion the most in-country and captured the greatest number of weapons at 31 per standard battalion. It is also significant that even with all this activity they were able to reduce their friendly losses. This is shown by the rise to 9.5:1 in the already high kill ratio. These losses were reduced by using lift support to pursue the enemy, rather than wade through a trail of mines and booby traps.



Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Although all of the 2d Division's regiments did well during the 1st quarter, the division's operational effectiveness was reduced by the very low assessment of the 6th Regiment.

Trends. The 2d Division leads the ARVN infantry in the number of enemy eliminated per standard battalion, but has shown a downward trend for the past three quarters. The 2d Division's weapons captured trend is not dropping with its enemy eliminated trend, which is a favorable sign. The upward trend of the 2d Division's kill ratio is also a favorable sign. The trend in operational effectiveness and leadership assessment is still down due to the low rating awarded the 6th Regiment. The 2d Division, one of ARVN's most improved organizations in 1969, continued to obtain outstanding results and was a top ARVN division.

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Chart 30



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**51ST REGIMENT**

Environment. The enemy density dropped slightly in the 51st Regiment's area as it did elsewhere in-country. RF/PF strength increases almost made up for the U.S. personnel reductions in this area.

Effort. The 51st Regiment almost doubled its amount of time on combat operations, but it was still below average at 42 percent. This occurred when the 51st Regiment moved its headquarters away from the city of Da Nang and commenced combined operations with the 5th U.S. Marine Regiment. The percent of time spent on security, however, is still highest in country at 49 percent.

Combat Support. The 51st Regiment's combat support and hours of contact also increased but both were still below average.



Results. The 51st Regiment's number of enemy eliminated at 39 per standard battalion, and weapons captured at 11.4, reflect their increased efforts and opportunity but still remained below average. The kill ratio dropped to 2.3:1 due to the regiment's heavy losses from mines and booby traps. This occurred when the regiment first went out on extensive combat operations.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The 51st Regiment's operational effectiveness assessment was high due to the favorable impression it created when it moved into the field.

Trend. The 51st reversed its downward trend in the number of enemy eliminated. Its weapons captured trend line also rose. The 51st Regiment's kill ratio dropped sharply due to losses caused by mines and booby traps. Its operational effectiveness and leadership trends are rising.

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Chart 31



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22D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density decreased during the quarter, while friendly density increased to 3.47 per square kilometer. In March the 47th Regimental Headquarters and three battalions were moved to the 24th STZ in Pleiku to help fill the void created by the move of the US 4th Division elements from that area.

Effort. The 22d Division continued to devote the majority of its time to pacification. During the 1st Qtr CY 70, the division spent only seven percent of its time on combat operations --lowest among ARVN organizations-- while devoting 75 percent to pacification. The division has received orders from JGS to withdraw its forces from pacification missions by the end of 2d Qtr CY 70 and plans are underway to achieve this goal.

Combat Support. There was an increase in each type of combat support provided except tactical air and helicopter gunships, which decreased slightly. Helicopter lift sorties more than doubled from the previous quarter, which reflects a shift from large size operations to small airmobile operations.

Results. Hours of contact and the number of enemy eliminated decreased sharply from the previous quarter and fell below the ARVN average. This was caused by the reduction in activity following the 47th Regiment's engagement at Bu Prang/Duc Lap. However, the enemy KIA per hour of contact was highest in-country at 3.8:1. The increase in the number of weapons captured was also favorable. The kill ratio was down but remained slightly above the ARVN average.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Despite an overall down-trend in results achieved during the quarter the division's assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership rose to near average and the highest achieved by that organization in over a year. The commander of the 47th Regiment was replaced in February and leadership has improved throughout the regimental elements of the division. However, a shortage of experienced battalion and company level commanders still exist in some of the units.


Trends. The number of enemy eliminated dropped sharply following the battle at Bu Prang/Duc Lap by elements of the 47th Regiment. The kill ratio trend has been favorable since 3d Qtr CY 69. Although there was a slight decrease in the first quarter the division remained slightly above the ARVN average. The operational effectiveness and leadership trend, which showed a decline during 1969, rose to near average in the first quarter. The 22d Division has performed adequately when employed on combat operations, however, it continues to suffer from excessive employment on pacification and security missions. Its leadership has been recently strengthened and reflects definite improvement.

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Chart 32


## 23D DIV - 1ST QTR CY 70








◀ PREVIOUS QTR

---- ARVN INF AVG

## TRENDS



## PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECT  
NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SFER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 68

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23D DIVISION

Environment. Enemy density decreased from the fourth quarter due to the withdrawal of two regiments that were located near Bu Prang during the latter part of the fourth quarter. Friendly density increased slightly but was lowest among the DTAs and STZs.

Effort. The division's effort on combat operations was well below average, as were combat operations results. The division spent 31 percent of its time on security missions and was second highest in-country in time devoted to static pacification. During the quarter, one battalion from each regiment was assigned to primary mission of pacification, while one battalion was responsible for the security of Dalat, a JGS-directed mission. The division also had one battalion assigned as security for a land clearing operation by US Engineers in Quang Duc province during most of the quarter.

Combat Support. Combat support was well below average and decreased in each category except helicopter lift support, which increased. This reflects the corps commander's recent shift from battalion and larger size operations to small unit airmobile operations, targeted against the enemy's smaller elements.

Results. The division's hours of contact decreased sharply and was second lowest among ARVN organizations. The number of enemy eliminated and weapons captured also decreased. During the quarter the division only eliminated 86 enemy, and its kill ratio was lowest in-country at 1.4:1. The division lost 46 men while killing 46 enemy personnel.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of the division's operational effectiveness and leadership was below average, with advisors reporting poor leadership among company grade officers and a general lack of aggressiveness when engaged in offensive operations.


Trends. The number of enemy eliminated decreased sharply in the first quarter, after having reached the ARVN average in the fourth quarter during the Bu Prang/Duc Lap battle. The kill ratio trend has generally been unfavorable, with the division remaining below average since the 1st Qtr CY 69. The increase in the fourth quarter is attributable to the results achieved during the Bu Prang/Duc Lap battle. Trends in operational effectiveness and leadership have generally been below average except during the 4th Qtr CY 69. Poor leadership among company grade commanders and a general lack of aggressiveness when engaged in offensive operations are cited as contributing factors.

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Chart 33

## 42D REGT-1ST QTR CY 70




◀ PREVIOUS QTR






---- ARMN INF ARV

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## TRENDS



## PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECT LEADERSHIP  
NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

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42D REGIMENT

Environment. Enemy density decreased slightly while friendly density increased to 1.99 per square kilometer. This increase was due to the movement of the 47th Regiment minus one battalion into the STZ in March to occupy the TAOR vacated by elements of the 4th US Infantry Division.

Effort. During the first quarter the regiment spent only 31 percent of its time on combat operations--second lowest in-country--while devoting the greatest amount of time in-country to security operations (52 percent). The regiment continued to give considerable attention to training, devoting a total of 11 percent of its time to this effort, which was highest among ARVN organizations.

Combat Support. Combat support provided was below average and decreased from the previous quarter in each category except helicopter lift support, which increased. Within the corps, the regiment was the largest user of helicopter lift sorties and artillery support. The regiment was second lowest in-country in the use of tactical air and helicopter gunship support.

Results. Although the regiment improved in the number of enemy eliminated, weapons captured, and kill ratio, overall results achieved were below average and lowest in-country for the second quarter. During the quarter the regiment only eliminated a total of 26 enemy personnel and captured one weapon for every 5.2 enemy eliminated. The above average kill ratio was of no real significance since it was based on only 26 enemy killed during the entire quarter.


Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The regiments assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership remains below average and lowest among ARVN organizations. Although the regimental commander is considered to be an excellent leader, he is hampered by ineffective leaders at battalion and company level. The commander of the second battalion was replaced in late March.

Trends. The regiment remains at or near the bottom in most measures of unit effectiveness. The number of enemy eliminated, though slightly improved from the first quarter, has been below average since 2d Qtr CY 69. The kill ratio has shown a steady improvement over the past three quarters, but has been based on a very small number of enemy kills. Operational effectiveness and leadership trends continue below average, with serious leadership problems being reported among battalion and company grade commanders. On 1 May 1970 this regiment was operationally assigned to the 22d Division. This reorganization may produce improved employment and results, however, serious leadership problems will continue to exist and a problem of expanded control has now been added for the 22d Division.

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Chart 34


**5TH DIV 1ST QTR CY 70**




◀ PREVIOUS QTR

----- ARVN INF A/V


**TRENDS**




**PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS**




**KILL RATIO**




**SECURITY, STATIC PACIFICATION**



**OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND LEADERSHIP**



**RESERVE, TRAINING AND REHABILITATION**



NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED 5TH QTR CY 69  
EFFECTIVE 5TH QTR CY 70

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**5TH DIVISION**

Environment. Enemy density decreased slightly to .76 per square kilometer. Friendly density increased to 5.52 per square kilometer despite the redeployment of the US 1st Division--this due primarily to increases in ARVN strengths and realignment of FWMAF.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations by the 5th Division rose from 76 percent to 79 percent, the highest in ARVN, but total time spent on offensive operations declined slightly due to less effort in support of pacification. The 5th Division spent more time on small unit operations and ambushes, which provided lower levels of command with more experience and increased confidence.

Combat Support. The 5th Division made increasing use of combat support in the first quarter, and was above average in all support categories except helicopter lift. The battalions tended to rely too heavily on air and artillery support.

Results. The 5th Division continued to perform below the ARVN infantry average with hours of contact, number of enemy eliminated and number of weapons captured decreasing for the second straight quarter. Its kill ratio dropped from a respectable 7:1 for the fourth quarter, when the division suffered few friendly KIA, to a below average 4:1 kill ratio as friendly casualties increased. This increase in friendly casualties was caused by mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The division's operational effectiveness and leadership assessments were above the ARVN infantry average; a sharp increase from the fourth quarter when they were substantially below average. Two regimental commanders were replaced during the first quarter.


Trends. The 5th Division's performance in terms of enemy eliminated per battalion has been on a steep down trend since the third quarter, the only time it exceeded the ARVN infantry average. The kill ratio dropped after a strong fourth quarter. Operational effectiveness improved as a result of replacing some weak battalion and regimental commanders. Its failure to show more improvement in the first quarter is attributable to the turbulence caused by its enlarged area of responsibility resulting from the redeployment of the US 1st Infantry Division and the turnover in commanders. More time will be needed for this division to gain in effectiveness and confidence.

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Chart 35


18 TH DIV-1ST QTR CY 70








◀ PREVIOUS QTR

— ARVN INF AVG

TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



— OPERATIONAL EFFECT  
— LEADERSHIP  
NOTE: DATA ON 749 CHARTS DERIVED FROM REVISED 1969 QUESTIONS  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

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18TH DIVISION

Environment. The 18th Division's DTA remained the most pacified in-country. There was a slight drop in enemy density to .38 per square kilometer and a slight increase in friendly density to 4.44 per square kilometer.

Efforts. The 18th Division's amount of time on offensive operations sharply increased to 80 percent in the first quarter after a fourth quarter low of 46 percent. This increase was caused by a reduction in the amount of time spent on security--to a low 11 percent--as the RF/PF took over most of the security missions.

Combat Support. All types of combat support were below average although artillery support increased slightly from the fourth quarter. This reflects the continued low hours of combat.

Results. The number of enemy eliminated and weapons captured increased but were still below the ARVN infantry average. However, the division was efficient in exploiting its few contacts so that the increase in enemy KIA and a decrease in friendly KIA combined to produce the highest kill ratio (11.7:1) of any ARVN infantry division.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. In the first quarter, the division gained in their operational effectiveness and leadership assessments to positions slightly above the ARVN average. The improvement is attributed to an increasing aggressiveness and better execution when in contact, quicker reaction to intelligence, excellent training program, and more experienced small unit leaders. Commanders are learning to modify their tactics and to shift operations to effectively counter enemy actions.




Trends. The 18th Division remained below average throughout 1969 and first quarter 1970 in enemy eliminated and weapons captured. The division has been above average in kill ratio for the last four quarters and led all ARVN infantry divisions during the first quarter. Operational effectiveness continued to oscillate and more time is needed to tell if this improvement is permanent. There has been some improvement in the division's extremely high desertion rate due to command emphasis.

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Chart 36

25TH DIV-1ST QTR CY 70



NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SECDEF QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

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25TH DIVISION

Environment. There was a slight drop in enemy density in the DTA, while friendly density increased to 3.87 per square kilometer. Significant numbers of NVA fillers were reported in VC units.

Effort. The 25th Division's effort was virtually all devoted to offensive operations, a category in which it led all ARVN infantry divisions. A substantial proportion of these operations, moreover, was devoted to active support of pacification. The division continued to conduct a large percentage of its offensive operations with US forces.

Combat Support. The 25th Division employed the greatest amount of helicopter lift and tactical air/gunship support in III Corps, but used the least amount of artillery support in-country. The helicopter lift sorties were used for multiple insertions of small units, following the enemy pattern of breaking down into squad size or smaller units.

Results. The number of enemy eliminated and weapons captured continued to be highest in the corps, reflecting the increased hours of contact. The kill ratio remained the highest of ARVN infantry divisions for the second straight quarter at 11.7:1.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The imagination and aggressiveness of the division leaders kept its operational effectiveness and leadership assessments among the highest in ARVN. The large number of small unit operations helped to develop leadership with a corresponding increase in confidence and aggressiveness.


Trends. The increase in enemy eliminated observed in 1969 continued into the 1st Qtr CY 70 and was the best achieved by any III Corps organization. The kill ratio likewise increased throughout 1969 and first quarter 1970, and led all ARVN infantry divisions in the fourth and first quarters. Similarly, the division's operational effectiveness increased in each of the past five quarters. Leadership improved and is high due to the extensive small unit operations. The 25th Division has emerged during the past year as one of ARVN's best divisions and indications are it will continue to improve its performance.

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Chart 37


7TH DIV-1ST QTR CY 70








◀ PREVIOUS QTR

---- ARVN INF AVG

TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED 7TH DIVISION QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 70

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7TH DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density, 1.86 per square kilometer, is the second highest in-country. It decreased slightly during the quarter. Friendly density in the division's DTA was the highest in-country at 13.5 per square kilometer, increasing with the growth of RF/PF, and employment of the 9th Division and three Marine battalions in the DTA.

Effort. The percent of time devoted to offensive operations increased to 62 percent, a 20 percent increase from last quarter. An excessive amount of time was spent on security (19 percent) and reserve (20 percent). The increase in offensive operations was a result of the new division commander moving his headquarters and regiments to the field.

Combat Support. The number of artillery rounds fired in support of the battalions increased slightly from the previous quarter and was above average. The amount of helicopter gunship and tactical air support decreased and was below average. The amount of helicopter lift decreased but remains above the country average.

Results. The large amount of artillery, tactical air and helicopter gunship support resulted in the fourth largest number of enemy eliminated in country (61.5 per battalion). This was accomplished with a below average amount of contact (16.4 hours per battalion) indicating an improvement in the efficiency of operations. Enemy captured and surrendered was the highest in country (18.9 per battalion). Over 60 percent of the kills resulted from the efforts of the 10th Regiment during its operations in Kien Hoa Province during the quarter. The division's kill ratio though increased from last quarter, remains low (3.1:1) with 48 percent of the friendly losses attributed to mines and booby traps. The number of weapons captured (13.2 per battalion) was slightly below the country average and showed a decrease from last quarter.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The division has one of the lowest operational effectiveness ratings in the country, resulting from the evaluation received by the 11th and 12th Regiments. The leadership assessment of the division's commanders remains one of the lowest in country, again primarily because of the 11th and 12th Regiments.


Trends. The number of enemy eliminated increased from last quarter. The 7th Division's kill ratio is below average but has shown the first upward trend since first quarter 1969. The division continues to suffer a high rate of casualties from mines and booby traps. The operational effectiveness and leadership trends are below the country average with the first quarter ratings being at a low level country-wide. While still operationally low this division has shown signs of positive improvement during the first quarter.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 39


## 9TH DIV-1ST QTR CY 70








◀ PREVIOUS QTR

---- ARVN INF AVG

## TRENDS



## PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECT  
NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED OPERATIONAL CYCLE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

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9TH DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density decreased to 0.73 per square kilometer even though one VCLF battalion was added to the enemy strength. Friendly strength increased slightly to 7.66 per square kilometer due primarily to RF/PF increases.

Effort. The time on combat operations increased during the quarter from 59 to 68 percent. During the quarter the division conducted two major operations out of its DTA, both in the 21st Division's DTA. One was conducted in January in Phuong Dinh, Kien Giang and Chuong Thien Provinces and the second, during March, near the U Minh Forest. A major operation was also conducted in the 9th Division's own DTA during February.

Combat Support. The 9th Division used the largest number of helicopter lift sorties, and second largest amount of artillery, tactical air and helicopter gunship support in-country.

Results. The 9th Division's hours of contact were the third highest in country at 31.2 per battalion and the number of enemy eliminated --92.6 per battalion--and killed--80.7 per battalion--were the second highest in country. The number of weapons captured was above average at 18.2 per battalion. The kill ratio of 5.6:1 was the fourth highest in country. The number of friendly personnel killed was high with 56 percent of these casualties resulting from mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The Divisions operational effectiveness and leadership assessment dropped slightly from last quarter but was still among the highest in-country.


Trends. The number of enemy eliminated has continued to increase since 3d Qtr CY 69. The kill ratio has improved steadily since second quarter 1969. Operational effectiveness and leadership assessments dropped slightly during the first quarter but are still above the country-wide average. The 9th Division operated out of its own DTA again during first quarter and the results attained show the division continues to improve in aggressiveness and flexibility. The 9th Division has greatly improved in overall performance and effectiveness and should continue to be one of ARVN's better divisions.

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Chart 39


21ST DIV-1ST QTR CY 70








◀ PREVIOUS QTR

---- ARVN INF AVG

TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECT  
LEADERSHIP  
NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED STEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

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21ST DIVISION

Environment. The enemy density dropped slightly during the quarter --.57 per square kilometer--even though the enemy had an additional sapper battalion in the DTA. The friendly density increased, reflecting the 9th Division's move into the DTA and an increase in RF/PF forces.

Effort. The amount of time spent on offensive operations increased by 10 percent with the majority of this increase resulting from extensive combat operations in March. 20 percent of the divisions' time was spent on security, reserve and rehabilitation.

Combat Support. The increased amount of time spent on offensive operations is reflected in the amount of combat support utilized. The number of artillery rounds increased by 40 percent while the use of air support increased by more than 90 percent.

Results. The 21st Division's hours of contact was down from last quarter; however, it remained above the country-wide average. The enemy eliminated at 56.0 per battalion was above average but also showed a decline from last quarter. The number of weapons captured was the largest in country with 22.8 per battalion. As during last quarter the division's kill ratio was below average (2.4:1) and continues to decline. The division had the highest number of friendly personnel killed in-country. Thirty percent of the friendly kills resulted from enemy mines and booby traps. The division has one strong regiment, the 32d, which accounted for 64 percent of the total enemy killed and achieved a kill ratio of 4.2:1.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Operational effectiveness and leadership have increased during the quarter and are now above average. This increase is due primarily to the operational effectiveness and leadership of the 32d Regiment.


Trends. The enemy eliminated is above average for the quarter but continues the downward trend that was characteristic throughout last year. The kill ratio is one of the lowest in country resulting from the large number of friendly losses. Operational effectiveness and leadership have shown an upward swing and are now above average. The 21st Division has regressed slightly from its previous position as a leading division in IV Corps.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 40


AIRBORNE-1ST QTR CY 70








◀ PREVIOUS QTR

---- ARVN INF ARVN

TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



— OPERATIONAL EFFECT    - - - LEADERSHIP  
NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART IS DERIVED FROM REVISED SSIEN QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 6TH QTR CY 68

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AIRBORNE DIVISION

Environment. During the 1st Qtr CY 70, battalions of the Airborne Division continued operations with the US 1st Cavalry Division (AM) in northern III Corps. Six of the nine battalions were rotated on operations in Tay Ninh and Phuoc Long Provinces, along the Cambodian border, while two battalions were under the operational control of the Capital Military District and one was JGS reserve.

Effort. Airborne battalions spent 78 percent of their time on offensive operations during the first quarter, 71 percent of which was devoted to combat operations. There was no change in the amount of time spent on security missions from the previous quarter. Effort devoted to training decreased, and was lowest among ARVN organizations.

Combat Support. Combat support almost doubled, and the airborne battalions were ARVN's greatest user of artillery, tactical air, and helicopter gunship support during the quarter, and ARVN's second highest user of helicopter lift sorties. The large number of helicopter lift sorties per battalion (430) illustrate the extensive small unit airmobile operations being conducted, and the extent of helicopter support being provided the airborne battalions by the US 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

Results. Hours of contact almost doubled the previous quarter and was highest in-country per standard battalion at 41.9. Operational results improved markedly, and were the best achieved by the division since 2d Qtr CY 69. The number of enemy eliminated and weapons captured more than doubled and rose well above the ARVN average. However, the 3d and 11th Battalions averaged only one enemy KIA each during the quarter. The kill ratio also improved a hundred percent, but remained slightly below the ARVN average. Airborne units captured one weapon for every 2.2 enemy eliminated. This was the best ratio among the special units and third highest in-country.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Despite a marked improvement in the operational results achieved, the division's assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership dropped sharply from the fourth quarter, and was the lowest awarded to the division since 1st Qtr CY 69. This is attributable primarily to the very low ratings awarded the 9th and 11th Battalions.


Trends. There was an up trend in the number of enemy eliminated and kill ratio for the first time since 2d Qtr CY 69. Results achieved in each of these categories doubled the previous quarter. The number of weapons captured also increased and the number of weapons captured per enemy eliminated trend remained high. Operational effectiveness and leadership assessments, which were highest among ARVN organizations throughout 1969, dropped sharply during the first quarter as a result of the low rating awarded two of the battalions. Advisors, however, still consider the majority of the airborne commanders to be excellent leaders.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 41


**ENEMY KILLS BY AIRBORNE BATTALION**



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**



Chart 42



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 43

**CONFIDENTIAL**

# CONFIDENTIAL

## ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

Environment. The 17 cavalry squadrons were employed throughout the four corps tactical zones during the quarter. One squadron is organic to each of the divisions, and the rest operate under corps control.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations increased but remained below the ARVN average. Many units continued to perform extensive security and reserve missions, which accounted for a large portion of the cavalry's effort (42 percent) during the quarter. II Corp's squadrons spent 92 percent of their time on security missions. Time devoted to training was below average.

Combat Support. Combat support increased but remained below the ARVN average. The greatest increase was in the use of tactical air and helicopter gunship support, which more than doubled from the previous quarter.

Results. Hours of contact increased and rose above the ARVN average. This was primarily due to the large number of hours of contact in IV Corps, whose squadrons averaged 48 hours each, per standard battalion. The number of enemy eliminated increased due to the efforts of the 17th Armored Cavalry Squadron in I Corps, and the 16th Armored Cavalry Squadron in IV Corps. They eliminated 211 and 322 enemy personnel, respectively, during the quarter; and accounted for 61 percent of the total number of enemy eliminated by cavalry squadrons. Ten of the 17 squadrons averaged less than 10 kills each during the period. The number of weapons captured increased country-wide but remained below average. The kill ratio was highest among ARVN organizations at 12.4:1.



Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership remained below average, with no change from the previous quarter, even though a few individual squadrons did well.

Trends. Although there has been an upward trend since 4th Qtr CY 69 in the number of enemy eliminated, cavalry squadrons have been below average for the last four consecutive quarters. The cavalry's kill ratio, which fell in the 3d Qtr CY 69, has increased since that time to become highest among ARVN organizations in the first quarter. There has been little change in the operational effectiveness and leadership trend over the past three quarters.

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Chart 44



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MARINE DIVISION

Environment. The Marine battalions operated in IV Corps during 1st Qtr CY 70 organized under two brigade staffs. Brigade "A" was absorbed into the joint staff of ATF 211 during January and February. The brigade became OPCON to the 21st Division in late February. Brigade "B" operated in Dinh Trong and Kien Hoa Provinces OPCON to the 7th Division. Six of the Marine battalions have rotated between the two brigades, and one battalion is maintained in Saigon as JCS reserve. The newly activated 7th Battalion was deployed in February as part of ATF 211, and the newly activated 8th Battalion is undergoing training. The 3d Artillery Battalion was activated; one battery has been deployed and a second battery is currently undergoing training.

Effort. The combat commitments of the Marines have been extensive during the 1st Qtr CY 70 as reflected by the high proportion of time spent on combat operations (89 percent). This was well above the ARVN infantry average and represents a high for all ARVN/VNMC organizations.

Combat Support. Combat support of all types increased again this quarter particularly helicopter lifts which doubled, reflecting the extensive airmobile operations conducted. The use of artillery support also increased as additional artillery units become operational during the quarter.

Results. The number of enemy eliminated remained well above the ARVN average but was down from the previous quarter. Weapons captured increased and were above the ARVN average. Hours of contact increased and enemy KIA per hour of contact was second highest in-country. Results obtained by the Marine battalions generally compared higher than the other units operating in the same DTAs and all battalions obtained good results including the newly deployed 7th Battalion which obtained 28 KIA. Significant results were obtained by the 1st Battalion during operations in the U Minh Forest in January. A successful defense and counter-attack was conducted against two VC battalions with resulting enemy losses at 95 KIA compared to 24 VNMC KIA. The kill ratio at 2.9:1 was below average and resulted from the high number of casualties due to mines and booby traps. Forty-six percent of the Marine casualties were from mines and booby traps.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. Operational effectiveness and leadership remained extremely high during the quarter. All of the Marine battalions were commanded by excellent, aggressive officers.


Trends. The enemy eliminated by Marine battalions increased steadily since 3d Qtr CY 69 with a slight decrease in 1st Qtr CY 70 but remained well above average. The kill ratio trend has been generally unfavorable except during the fourth quarter. Trends in operational effectiveness and leadership which increased sharply in the 3d Qtr CY 69 have remained high in 1970. The improved Marine results which began in late 1969 were due primarily to the improved employment of units assisted by extensive use of airmobile and naval craft assets.

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Chart 45

ENEMY KILLS BY MARINE BATTALION




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**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 46

**ENEMY KILLS BY RANGER BATTALION**




**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Chart 47


RANGERS - 1ST QTR CY 70








◀ PREVIOUS QTR

----- ARVN INF AVG

TRENDS



PERCENT TIME ON MISSIONS



OPERATIONAL EFFECT  
NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SFER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

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RANGERS

Environment. The 20 ranger battalions are located throughout the four Corps Tactical Zones and conditions under which they operated during the quarter varied widely. Ranger battalions in I Corps operated primarily in the western sections of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, while IV Corps battalions operated along the Cambodian border areas in Chau Doc Province. II Corps battalions spent most of the quarter in and around Pleiku, in the 24th STZ, however, one battalion spent one month on combat operations in the 23d DTA, south of Dalat. The nine battalions of III Corps spent the majority of their time in the Capital Military District.

Effort. Time spent on combat operations increased slightly but remained well below the ARVN average. Time devoted to security operations increased to 44 percent as compared to 38 percent during the previous quarter. This was primarily due to the predominance of security operations among the battalions situated in the Capital Military District. Time devoted to training decreased from the previous quarter, but remained above the ARVN average.

Combat Support. Combat support increased and was above average in each category except artillery support, which was slightly below the ARVN average. The increase in combat support is reflected in the increased hours of contact, which more than doubled from the fourth quarter.

Results. Operational results more than doubled the previous quarter, and were the best achieved by ranger battalions in well over a year. The majority of success attained by the rangers is attributable to the outstanding performance of the battalions of I and IV Corps, which accounted for 88 percent of the total number of enemy eliminated during the quarter. In I Corps, the 37th and 39th Ranger Battalions achieved excellent results while operating as a part of the 1st Armored Brigade Task Force during operation DOUNG SOU 70/3, conducted in February and March. During the quarter, these two battalions eliminated over 550 enemy personnel. Likewise, in IV Corps, ranger battalions operating in Chau Doc and Kieng Giang Provinces eliminated over 600 enemy personnel in that area. III Corps battalions achieved the least results. The nine battalions stationed in the Capital Military District averaged less than six enemy personnel eliminated during the quarter. Two of the three battalions in II Corps average four kills each during the quarter.

Operational Effectiveness/Leadership. The assessment of operational effectiveness and leadership rose above average and reflects an overall improvement in leadership and combat effectiveness among ranger units.

Trends. The number enemy eliminated reached a low point in the 3d Qtr CY 69 and remained below the ARVN average for the remainder of the year. The upward trend began in the fourth quarter and rose sharply in 1st Qtr CY 70. The kill ratio which showed a downtrend during the last half of 1969 also increased the first quarter to above average. The operational effectiveness and leadership assessment trend has shown a steady increase since 2d Qtr CY 69, and reached a new high in the first quarter.

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
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## 4. (C-NOFORN) ARVN/VNMC Problem Areas.

a. General. Major objectives of SEER are to identify weaknesses and problem areas which reduce combat effectiveness and through analytical methods determine courses of action by which RVNAF, with MACV assistance, may increase the effectiveness of their forces. This section contains major problem areas reported by senior advisors to ARVN units and MACV staff actions taken to assist in resolving the problems. In addition this section contains major problems highlighted in the MACV analysis of ARVN/VNMC organizations.

b. Infantry Battalion Strength. ARVN and Marines expanded slightly during the first quarter to 450,000, approximately 30,000 above the authorized level (Chart 48). Personnel in the pipeline decreased by 10 percent to 94,000 with half of these in training and schools. The large number in pipeline continues to severely limit the personnel available in combat organizations. Chart 49 shows the authorized and average assigned strength of ARVN infantry battalions by division. The total assigned strength of ARVN infantry units increased by 2,500 during the first quarter, but was 19 percent below authorized levels, which also increased by 4,100 on 1 January 1970. The ARVN combat understrength in terms of combat units represents 22 battalions. The 9th Division has the lowest assigned strength with a 30 percent shortfall, while the 25th Division is highest with six percent. Shortages were approximately 10 percent in late 1968 and first quarter 1969.


Chart 48



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
Chart 49



c. Casualties Due to Mines and Booby Traps.

(1) Mines and booby trap casualties continue to be a serious problem in ARVN/VNMC. In the first quarter deaths from mines and booby traps decreased and since total friendly KIA decreased a resulting increase in percent of total casualties due to mines and booby traps resulted. Chart 50 depicts the magnitude of the problem during the last five quarters. In the fourth quarter 1968, casualties due to these devices were at a low of 278 and accounted for only 22 percent of the total.


Chart 50

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(2) Chart 51 presents data on this problem for each major organization. The problem has been particularly acute for IV Corps units, including the VNMC, as well as the 51st Regiment and the 22d and 5th Divisions.

Chart 51

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d. Battalion Problem Areas.

(1) During the fourth quarter advisors to the 186 ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions and armored cavalry squadrons submitted responses to questions contained in the MACV SEER Questionnaire which indicated potential problem areas. Chart 52 - Part I and II on the next page contains the questions which were indicated by a high frequency of unsatisfactory responses. The percentages are based on the frequency of responses from approximately 372 questionnaires. SEER problem areas evaluations include only battalions since the areas of concern are based on problems which exist primarily at that level. Certain problems show noticeable differences between ARVN infantry battalions and special units (airborne, Marines, cavalry and rangers) and, while not indicated on the chart, these are noted in the comments below. This quarter all problems show improvement from the previous quarter. The problem areas in the order they appear on Chart 52 are as follows:

(2) Inadequate Dependent Housing. Dependent housing has been a continual concern of ARVN and major efforts to improve its quantity and quality are being made. Conditions have improved slightly from the fourth quarter, but 78 percent of advisors still consider the amount of housing to be inadequate and 57 percent reported the quality as inadequate. Special units report slightly fewer problems in dependent housing than ARVN infantry battalions.

(3) Intelligence. The intelligence function in ARVN battalions has presented major problems as indicated by the responses concerning timeliness, collection efforts, and security leaks. Forty-three percent of advisors report that the intelligence received by the unit was untimely 50 percent or more of the time during the first quarter. This, however, represents a slight improvement from the previous quarter. Efforts to collect intelligence was judged inadequate in eight percent of the units, which is only half of those so judged in the fourth quarter--a significant improvement. However, the special unit percentage was three times that of ARVN infantry. While not displayed on the chart it is noted that advisors reported most units as reacting appropriately to available intelligence most of the time, with 16 percent reporting it as a problem. There is reason to believe that the enemy is sometimes forewarned of the unit's combat operations by security leaks. Approximately 26 percent of the advisors reported this area as a problem, with the percentage in ARVN infantry organizations being more than twice that of special units.

(4) Reinforcement. 18 percent of the advisors reported that their units failed to reinforce elements in contact with adequate speed and in sufficient strength half of the time or more, but this is still an improvement from the previous quarter. The problem is more serious in special units than in infantry battalions.

(5) Leadership. NCO leadership capability is reported as a greater problem than officer leadership with 13 percent reporting a

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Chart 52-I

**BATTALION PROBLEM AREAS**


PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING PROBLEMS:

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80


**INADEQUATE QUANTITY OF DEPENDENT HOUSING**



**LOW QUALITY OF DEPENDENT HOUSING**



**UNTIMELY INTELLIGENCE**



**UNITS EFFORTS TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE**



**SECURITY LEAKS**



**REINFORCEMENTS**



**MANEUVER BATTALIONS**


**▼ PREVIOUS QUARTER**

NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69

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Chart 52-II



NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY68

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problem in the first quarter, an improvement from the previous quarter. Company grade officer leadership ability was reported as inadequate by eight percent of the advisors during the first quarter. The leadership problem is greater in ARVN infantry battalions than in special units.

(6) Aggressiveness. 12 percent of the advisors reported that units fought aggressively when in contact one-half or less of the time, an improvement from the previous quarter. This problem is slightly greater in ARVN infantry battalions than special units.

(7) Indecisive Actions. Some unit commanders failed to take decisive action when the opportunity arose. Approximately 14 percent of the advisors reported this occurred 50 percent or more of the time in the first quarter, with the problem slightly less in ARVN infantry battalions than special units.

(8) Desertions. Desertions are a continuing problem in ARVN, and have been receiving command emphasis. Consequently, unit commanders' actions designed to cope with the desertion problem are reported to be inadequate in only seven percent of the ARVN maneuver battalions, a significant decrease from the previous quarter. The problem is not as great in special units.

(9) Spare Parts Availability. The availability of spare parts was reported to be inadequate in a large number of units. This problem is particularly serious in artillery battalions, which reported critical shortages of parts for mission essential items such as fire control equipment, panoramic telescopes and firing mechanisms. Some combat vehicles of armored cavalry squadrons, and vehicles and weapons in all type units were deadlined for lack of spare parts; one regiment reported 30 of 64 1/4 ton trucks were deadlined for this reason. Advisors report the supply system has been distorted by failure of units to requisition items known to be in short supply, purchase of parts on the local economy, procurement of parts by advisors and failure of units to distribute available parts to the user. The solution to the problem lies in making the supply system work; adequate supplies of repair parts are reported in-country in the supply system, but are not properly requisitioned and distributed.

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## e. Staff Problem Areas.

(1) Chart 53 - Part I and II on the next page covers selected staff functions reported as inadequate in the SEER Questionnaire by advisors to ARVN/VNMC organizations. The problem area functions are grouped separately by maneuver battalion staffs, and by regiment, group, brigade and division staffs, since battalions have experienced greater difficulty in staff operations than higher units. While the analysis includes all staff functions for completeness the G1/S1 and most of the G4/S4 functions appear to be operating effectively due to the low number of advisors reporting these as a problem.

(2) G1/S1 Functions. The personnel and morale functions have shown some improvement during the last quarter, with a substantial improvement being reported in the morale area. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G1/S1 section in the following categories:

a Maintains organization strength, keeps records, and arranges for replacements.

b Supervises personnel management by classifying, assigning, promoting and transferring troops.

c Develops and maintains morale through personnel services, decorations and awards, and graves registration.

(3) G2/S2 Functions. The intelligence function for all staffs has shown little improvement since the fourth quarter. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G2/S2 section in the following categories:

a Supervises, coordinates, and plans intelligence collection activities.

b Processes intelligence information through recording, evaluation, and interpretation, and disseminates intelligence.

c Plans and supervises counterintelligence activities.

(3) G3/S3 Functions. The operations and training functions have shown substantial improvement since the fourth quarter, particularly in the area of training programs. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G3/S3 section in the following categories:

a Analyzes missions, recommends priorities for utilization of manpower and equipment, and recommends requirements for tables of equipment and organization.

b Analyzes the training situation and proposes and implements training programs.

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
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Chart 53-I

**GI/SI, G2/S2 STAFF FUNCTIONS  
PROBLEM AREAS**

PERCENT OF ADVISORS REPORTING FUNCTIONS INADEQUATE

0      10      20      30      40      50



— REGIMENT/GROUP/BRIGADE/DIVISION STAFFS

\\\\\\ MANEUVER BATTALION STAFFS

▼ PREVIOUS QUARTER

NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69

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
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Chart 53-II

**G3 / S3, G4 / S4 STAFF FUNCTIONS  
PROBLEM AREAS**

PERCENTAGE OF ADVISORS REPORTING INADEQUATE:

0 10 20 30 40 50



— REGIMENT/GROUP/BRIGADE/DIVISION STAFFS

\\\\\\ MANEUVER BATTALION STAFFS

▼ PREVIOUS QUARTER

NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY 69

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c Analyzes the tactical situation, develops courses of action, and makes recommendations to the commander for operations.

(4) G4/S4 Functions. The logistics functions show little improvement since the fourth quarter, with higher staffs regressing in supply and maintenance. Battalion staffs show some improvement in all areas. The chart presents percentages of inadequate ratings of the G4/S4 section in the following categories:

a Determines requirements for, procures, stores and allocates supplies.

b Makes provision for adequate medical support.

c Formulates, coordinates and supervises maintenance and repair programs.


f. Training Assessment. Training programs continue to receive emphasis in developing ARVN/VNMC effectiveness. To provide more depth, the revised SEER questionnaire has expanded the coverage of the training function, and this additional information is provided in this evaluation.

(1) Training Effectiveness. The 1st Qtr CY 70 training effectiveness evaluations presented in Chart 54 are based on advisors' responses to 16 different questions on frequency of training programs, results from training programs, and the manner in which training programs are conducted. I, II and III Corps organizations displayed an overall improvement from the previous quarter, and were above the ARVN infantry average. IV Corps regressed from the fourth quarter and remained below average, due primarily to the assessment of the 9th Division. The rangers were the only special unit showing improvement this quarter, while the airborne and Marine units showed significant regression.

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Chart 54



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(2) Training at Division Training Schools and the National Training Center (Chart 55). The quality of training at division training schools and the National Training Center is being addressed for the first time in the revised SEER questionnaire. Advisors report improvement since the previous quarter, however, 16 percent rate such training to be in the "poor" category.

(3) Training to Reduce Casualties (Chart 55). Training to reduce casualties has been separated into two categories: mine and booby trap casualties, and casualties from other causes. The number of advisors reporting the quality of training to reduce mine and booby trap casualties as "poor" dropped to 21 percent. Reports rating the training to reduce other casualties as "poor" increased to 17 percent. This latter category, however, showed a significant increase in the amount of "good" quality training.

(4) Training of Officers and NCOs (Chart 55). The evaluation of the quality of training received by company grade officers and unit NCOs remains high at 19 percent for officers and 25 percent for NCOs. The quantity of in-place leadership and responsibility training received by company grade officers and unit NCOs decreased from the fourth quarter.




(5) Training to Improve Combat Skills (Chart 55). The quality of training to improve combat skills has improved slightly from the fourth quarter, but the quantity of such training has decreased. During the first quarter, 22 percent of the advisors reported this training to be "poor" and 56 percent stated their units conducted such training for 30 hours or less during the entire quarter.

(6) Marksmanship Training (Chart 55). As in other training areas the quality of marksmanship training has improved this quarter, but 27 percent of the advisors still rate the training to be "poor". The amount of marksmanship training has also improved since the previous quarter, the only category to do so. However, units receiving no marksmanship training remain high at 20 percent.

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Chart 55

**ADVISORS' ASSESSMENT OF TRAINING****QUALITY OF TRAINING:****COMPANY GRADE OFFICER & UNIT NCO TRAINING****TRAINING TO IMPROVE:**

NOTE: DATA ON THIS CHART DERIVED FROM REVISED SEER QUESTIONNAIRE  
EFFECTIVE 4TH QTR CY69


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**CONFIDENTIAL****(7) Time Spent on Training by ARVN/VNMC Battalions.**

(a) Training Time. Time spent by ARVN organizations on training has decreased since last quarter. This reflects total time devoted by battalions to training and provides for combining the time spent by smaller units into battalion days. Time spent on major training programs such as national and division level training is also included. Chart 56 reflects a slight decrease in total time spent on training during the first quarter, a reversal of the 1969 favorable trend. There was, however, considerable variation in the time reported by each organization, with a low .5 percent reported by the 21st Division and a high 11.4 percent in the 42d Regiment.

(b) Refresher Training. Training programs for the maintenance of unit combat proficiency are conducted at training centers as unit refresher training--a four week course for the infantry battalions--or as command supervised in-place training. Each unit is required to complete refresher training once every three years. Chart 57 shows the percent of ARVN infantry battalions and special units which have either completed battalion refresher training since 1967 or are scheduled to receive it in 1970. The 1st Division is the only organization having its battalion training completed for the three year period. The 2d Division, 42d Regiment, and the Marines are scheduled to complete the training during 1970, while all other ARVN organizations will fall short by the indicated amount.

(c) In-place Training. The general consensus of the MACV staff is that there is a positive correlation between unit in-place training and unit combat effectiveness. In-place training is not necessarily limited to formalized classes held during stand-down time, but also includes pre-operational rehearsals, preparation and post-operation critiques. Short training sessions conducted at squad, platoon and company level to make immediate corrections of operational deficiencies are ideal in-place training.


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
Chart 57

ARVN/ VNMC REFRESHER TRAINING

ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION



SPECIAL UNITS



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g. Action on Fourth Quarter Problem Areas. Problems noted below were reported during the fourth quarter to MACV staff agencies. Actions taken during the first quarter to assist in resolving these problems are indicated.

(1) Rotation System for Commanders.

(a) Problem: III Corps feels there is a need to establish a rotation system for commanders, after they have completed a pre-determined amount of time in command. (This should not be over two years, and probably less)

(b) Comments: RVNAF personnel at every echelon after two years of service in a unit are authorized to submit a request for reassignment. Units are required to forward the request to the responsible agency for consideration and approval. Individuals may send a copy of their request for transfer directly to AG/JGS for consideration. The rotation plan still depends, however, on the strength proportion and personnel requirements of the units.

(2) Quality of US Advisors to ARVN Units.

(a) Problem: The shortage and low qualifications of some US advisors to ARVN combat units adversely effects efforts to improve combat effectiveness of these units.

(b) Comments: MACV is cognizant of the grade and branch of service substitutions currently made to fill advisor positions and is seeking improvement by several means. First, stricter adherence by the Department of the Army to requirements of the requisitions submitted. Several messages and letters have been dispatched to document the substitutions and in November the MACV AG visited DCSPER, DA to work on solutions for the problem. Improvement should become apparent in June 1970. The second means for improvement involves a measure of amelioration in assignments made by USARV. Third is the adjustment of assigned priorities within MACV. This was revised in January 1970 to upgrade the field advisory effort. The Army's overall shortage of officers, however, must be borne in mind. For example; the worldwide shortage of infantry majors is nearly 30 percent and of infantry captains nearly 40 percent. On the other hand, infantry lieutenants in MACV are 148 percent of authorization. In order to avoid repetitive, nonvolunteer tours, one-grade and combat arms substitutions are authorized by assignment policy. This policy will continue to make the best possible use of available personnel resources.

(3) Quality of ARVN Replacements from National Training Centers.

(a) Problem: The physical condition of personnel received from the NTC is occasionally unsatisfactory.

(b) Comments: JGS has directed discontinuance of accepting conscripts physically unfit for combat duty; the regulation was effective on 15 Oct 69. In regard to personnel drafted before Oct 69, units must move them to military hospitals for classification according to current regulations.

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**(4) Assigned Strength of ARVN Divisions.**

(a) Problem: The strength of the three IV Corps ARVN infantry divisions, which is currently 91 percent of authorized, is still below the minimum satisfactory goal of 95 percent of authorized as established by JGS. During CY 69, IV Corps divisions were able to recruit only 7,255 men, compared with a quota of 12,300. At the same time, JGS provided 23,566 inductees to meet a programmed quota of 39,600.

(b) Comments: An analysis of total assigned to authorized strengths of ARVN infantry divisions shows that IV Corps divisions compared favorably with other divisions. JGS is aware of the existing problems of ARVN divisions and recruiting and induction centers to recruit an adequate number of volunteers to fill projected quotas. JGS has taken action to improve recruiting of volunteers for ARVN divisions by publishing a recent memorandum on the division recruiting system. This memorandum outlines actions to be taken to increase division recruiting. JGS has placed a great deal of emphasis on this program and follow-up action. As a consequence there has been an upward trend in the number of volunteers recruited by ARVN divisions.

(c) Problem: A contributing factor to the continuing unsatisfactory strength is the fact that no funds are authorized to the divisions to support a recruiting program. All funds are allocated to and retained by the 4th Recruiting and Induction Center and their subordinate R&I Offices at province level.

(d) Comments: During each quarter of CY 69, Central POLWAR Division allocated 9,000\$VN per infantry division to support their recruiting program. Funds have also been programmed for CY 70. On a central level Central POLWAR Command is charged with responsibility for publicizing the recruiting campaign in support of ARVN divisions in such media as radio and TV, posters and banners, and newspapers. At the local level, the division POLWAR representative is required to use available publicity materials and support provided by the CTZ POLWAR and Central POLWAR Command.

(e) Problem: An additional factor which precludes divisions from attaining satisfactory strength levels is the fact that volunteers for the recruiting program are required to have birth certificates and ID cards, while inductees are not required to have these documents.

(f) Comments: JGS Directive 100-9, subject: Missions, Procedures for Management of Recruitment and Induction Offices, Subordinates and Centers, dated 5 December 1968 requires that both volunteers and draftees have either birth certificates or ID cards, but not both.

**(5) Command and Control in the 44th Special Tactical Zone.** Comments: This problem is under study at HQ MACV. Recent recommendations from DMAC are being considered along with proposals by RVNAF (JGS).

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## (6) Increase Infantry Battalions to Four Rifle Companies.

(a) Problem: The need for a fourth rifle company in infantry battalions.

(b) Comments: MACV agrees that ARVN infantry battalions would be more effective with a fourth rifle company to provide more riflemen for combat operations. However, how to accomplish it within the total manpower available and still meet other manpower requirements is the real problem. Approximately 31,000 personnel would be required to authorize four rifle companies for all infantry battalions including required medics, forward observer teams and additional personnel for administration and logistics support. Since RVNAF has reached a point where manpower to fill currently authorized spaces has become a real problem the basic question is how to allocate the total force between the various services and achieve a proper balance. A secondary problem which would be aggravated by the addition of a fourth rifle company is the leadership problems currently existing at battalions and lower levels. Presently, 47 percent of ARVN battalion commanders are two grades below that authorized. The fourth company would increase the already strained span of control of the battalion commander as well as dilute the leadership resources of lower levels. Accordingly, a fourth rifle company is not justifiable in view of manpower and leadership constraints.

## (7) Airborne Personnel Dector (APD) Operations.

(a) Problem: The advisory teams are not provided the equipment or personnel to effectively carry out APD operations.

(b) Comments: Headquarters, USAAG, III CTZ requested four XM3 APD on 14 May 1969. This, as the only request, was staffed with J4, J3 and MACMA. This request was not favorably considered at that time for the following reasons:

1 There was no operational requirement for the XM3 APD for either RVNAF or advisory teams.

2 The XM3 APD was procured for use within USARV with four detectors allocated to each field force headquarters. These should be available to support requests for use in ARVN operations.

3 The concept of issuing equipment to advisors for the use of RVNAF is not consistent with MACV policy. The mission of advisors is to advise and assist the commander and staff of RVNAF units to which assigned.

4 The XM3 APD is a highly specialized and sensitive item of equipment. Operators require not only detailed training but also extensive experience in interpreting readings. Availability of RVNAF helicopter assets to support use of the XM3 APD is another limiting factor that must be considered.

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(8) Employment of the 4th Armored Brigade.

(a) Problem: Direct orders have been issued at the local level to eliminate severe damage or destruction of M113 and other APCs. Commanders were directed to be less aggressive in closing with and destroying the enemy.

(b) Comments: HQ MACV is aware of the performance of the 4th Armored Brigade. Concern exists due to the achievements obtained by the 1st Armored Brigade in I Corps. The problem area letter did not indicate actions being taken at DMAC level to resolve problems presented. However, MACV understands that some of the problems addressed are now being resolved. Recommend that DMAC continue advisory efforts to resolve problems in armor employment and address this area in the next quarterly report or by separate letter if appropriate.

(9) Publishing New TOE by JGS.

(a) Problem: Major problems have been caused by the tendency of JGS to approve increases in unit strength without concurrently publishing a new table of equipment (TOE). An example is TOE 38-783 which does not include a track maintenance platoon.

(b) Comment: This is a continuing problem which has been the subject of correspondence to JGS as well as direct coordination between MACV and JGS staffs. The preparation of a TOE from concept to publication takes approximately nine months of joint MACV/JGS effort. On 14 November 1969, J3/JGS agreed to include four Track Vehicle Repair Teams (TOE20-935A) in TOE 38-783. Each team is authorized eight personnel for a total of 32 personnel per company. This TOE is 1 of 51 being prepared for publication by J3/JGS. The TOE was published on 14 March 1970.

(10) Inadequate Artillery Resources.

(a) Problem: Inadequate artillery support of operations and territorial security in 42d DTA.

(b) Comments: This subject has been studied and will be considered in future RVNAF force structure revisions.

(11) Communications/Engineer and Reconnaissance Support.

(a) Problem: The major problem which affected the combat effectiveness of the Airborne Division during the 4th Qtr CY 69 was a lack of communications, engineer, and reconnaissance support. Signal, engineer, and reconnaissance units of the division are not large enough to adequately support the division when it is committed to multi-brigade operations in remote jungle terrain.

(b) Comments: Headquarters MACV is in receipt of correspondence from J3/JGS requesting increased space authorizations to resolve the above listed problem areas. This matter is under study at HQ MACV at this time. Additional information will be provided when the current study is completed.

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(12) Logistics/Supply Shortages.

(a) Problem: There continues to be a shortage of protective masks in II Corps.

(b) Comments: ARVN and RF/PF units are authorized 425,549 protective masks. As of 29 Jan 70, there were 280,698 on hand and 169,884 due-in. The CONUS supply sources indicate 110,959 will be shipped to ARVN by the end of the 4th Qtr CY 70.

(c) Problem: The readiness condition of both the 3d and 14th Armored Cavalry Squadrons was improved with the receipt of 3,558 track shoe assemblies and major components for the M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC). Continued emphasis in this area is recommended to achieve the steady flow of assemblies and components required to solve the problem.

(d) Comments. Track shoes for the M113 APC have been critical since August 1969. In January, ARVN received 20,117 track shoes of which the 2d Area Logistics Command (ALC) received 2,778. ARVN records show that this release resulted in filling 92 percent of requisitions. There is no apparent shortage in-country of major assemblies; the 20th ARVN Ordnance Storage Base Depot has an ample stock on hand.

(e) Problem: Slow overall progress of dependent housing construction in II CTZ.

(f) Comments:

1 The self-help program uses salvage materials in providing additional shelters. No GVN nor US funds were identified with the program. Therefore, the program was not officially monitored by MACV.

2 The GVN funded program consists of the commodity support ARVN portion and the non-commodity support portion for VNN, VNAF, and RF. All housing units in both portions are either under construction or completed. Exact status is as follows:

	COMMODITY SUPPORT	NON-COMMODITY SUPPORT
Under construction	1,180	320
Completed	10	220
Total in program	1,190	540

3 Slow response by contractors in the non-commodity support portion is no longer a problem.

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4 The commodity support portion continues to be hindered by a lack of construction materials to complete the projects. II CTZ has received relatively few materials as compared to I, III, & IV CTZ.

(g) Problem: The 223d Artillery Battalion (105mm) missed its deployment date of 27 Dec 69 as the result of a shortage of seven howitzers.

(h) Comments: Sufficient assets were in country to meet the deployment schedule for this unit. Seven howitzers were released for shipment from the 20th OSBD on 8 Dec 69. These howitzers arrived at the 220th OSC on 28 Dec 69. They were issued to the 223d Artillery Battalion on 30 Dec 69.

(i) Problem: Sling Equipment for Airmobile Operations. Tables of organization require amendment to reflect an authorization of six sling sets per artillery battalion to provide simultaneous airlift.

(j) Comments: On 4 February 1970, letters to II Corps and MAC were forwarded requesting corps G-4 advisors to reevaluate all unit authorizations within their respective corps areas. In addition, a recommendation was made that all authorizations resulting from the reevaluation be placed on one document, a table of allowance, to insure that any unique requirements are satisfied.

(k) Problem: Shortage of Repair Parts to Fill Prescribed Load Lists (PLL)..

(l) Comments: This problem has surfaced as a result of ARVN units using concurrent spare parts without placing a demand on their direct support unit or submitting a valid requisition to fill their prescribed load lists. With few exceptions in each technical service, repair parts are available in country in the ARVN supply system. The long order-and-ship time to fill field depot requisitions from base depots in Saigon has been studied by the Central Logistics Command. Within the past six months water shipment has been reduced from 30-45 days to 15-20 days between Saigon and II CTZ Field Depots. Continued efforts will be made by the DCSLOG/CLC Advisory Division to monitor the progress of filling requisitions for repair parts in II Corps.

(m) Problem: The present ARVN combat boot is reported as unsatisfactory for tropical use and long lead times exist in obtaining an acceptable replacement.

(n) Comments:

1 The complaint voiced by the soldier is that he experiences sore feet which is caused by shrinking fibers after use. QM/CAD has requested Matick Laboratories to evaluate the jungle shoe currently manufactured in Korea to determine if the criticisms associated with the jungle shoe are really warranted and, if so, what might be done to eliminate or minimize the reported shortcoming. The following factors are also pertinent:

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a The anticipated demand for jungle shoes is 923,939 pair for CY 70.

b The average unit price of the jungle shoe which is currently produced in Korea is \$1.90 a pair.

c A contract has been let for production of an improved jungle boot within RVN. The ultimate average price has not yet been determined.

d The US-made jungle shoe costs \$8.86 a pair (plus shipping costs).

2 The reevaluation of the current jungle shoe and the production of an improved boot in RVN are considered to be interim steps to resolving the jungle shoe issue. QM/CAD does not recommend trying to obtain the higher priced US-made jungle shoes for the RVNAF at this time.

h. Current Problem Areas Reported by Senior Advisors. The problems indicated below have been reported to MACV staff agencies for appropriate assistance. Actions taken during the quarter to resolve these areas will be reported in the 2d Qtr CY 70, MACV SEER Report. While not covered in detail, major effort is also conducted in each corps to correct many of these problems.

(1) Desertions. II Corps organizations continue to experience problems with high desertion rates. It has been determined that the primary cause of desertions in the highlands has been the poor personnel services available to the troops. The corps commander has taken special interest in the improvement of personnel services and has recommended appropriate courses of action to JGS. These recommendations have been discussed in the last two quarterly problem areas reports, but no significant action has been taken to improve the situation.

(2) Dependent Housing. The GVN funded program in II Corps is progressing at a slow pace, however, the CY 69 program appears to be nearing completion as necessary material continues to be delivered to the building sites. As experienced with the CY 69 program, the excessive time to complete contract action is expected to cause delay in the CY 70 program. It is recommended that ARVN dependent housing receive a higher national priority with an accompanying increase in funds. This appears to be the only way in which ARVN dependent housing needs can be realistically met.

(3) Civil Affairs. A lack of funds and materials continue to hamper civic action programs. The reduction of RVNAF appropriated civic action funds and the disapproval of MACV contingency funds for civic action purposes preclude any outstanding accomplishments in civic action. Materials and funds must be made available for ARVN if the civic action program is to be effective.

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(4) Leadership. Leadership continues to be weak among lower ranking officers and noncommissioned officers. Even the most competent captain or lieutenant lacks the experience to effectively command and control a battalion size force. Action should be taken to fill all senior command and staff positions with experienced field grade officers.

(5) Repairs and Utilities (R&U) Support. Experience gained in the recent turnover of bases to ARVN units in III Corps has indicated the need for substantial improvement of ARVN base maintenance or R&U support. Insufficient funds and lack of effective R&U organizations and systems are hampering the ability of ARVN units to maintain base facilities. Especially critical are water supply, electrical power and communications systems.

(6) Communication Security. Communications security practices throughout RVNAF in IV Corps are weak. DMAC has started corrective actions by a series of formal memorandums and meetings pointing out existing deficiencies, to IV Corps staff and offering assistance to correct these. Considerable assistance could be afforded by a combined MACV/JGS OPSEC Team survey of IV Corps Headquarters and representative subordinate units, with follow-up command emphasis by JGS to correct all improper procedures being used.

(7) Officer Program. Senior commanders feel that ARVN officer programs have few motivating factors. The present ARVN system for imposing punishments for poor performance or presenting awards for outstanding performance are often ineffectively employed by commanders. The lack of qualified replacements for those who should be relieved is also a limiting factor.

(8) Quality of ARVN Replacements from National Training Centers. The quality of replacements being assigned from the training centers continue to be unsatisfactory in the 42d Regiment. The majority of replacements received during 1st Qtr CY 70 were category "B" conscripts. It appears that the high desertion rate in the 42d Regiment is directly related to the number of Category "B" conscripts contained within its units. In an effort to improve the overall capability of the 42d Regiment and reduce the desertion rate, action must be taken by JGS to reduce the number of category "B" conscripts being assigned to the regiment.

(9) Logistics/Supply Shortages.

(a) Shortages in artillery fire direction equipment such as panoramic sights and aiming circles exist in I Corps artillery units. These shortages seriously degrade combat support when artillery units are deployed in platoon and battery minus configurations.

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(b) Borescoping of ARVN artillery weapons is currently being performed by the US. This capability should be provided to ARVN Direct Support Ordnance Battalions so that self-sufficiency can be achieved.

(c) Due to a change in the infantry battalion Table of Organization and Equipment, dated 29 September 1969, the authorization for M-60 machine guns was increased from nine to 22 per battalion. Upon receipt of the new authorization document, II Corps organizations submitted requisitions to their supporting Area Logistics Commands, however, coordination indicates an estimated 90 days delay before delivery can be accomplished.

(d) A serious shortage of repair parts exist in the 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron. On 1 May 1970 the responsibility for repair parts support for the 14th Armored Cavalry Squadron will be assumed by the 22d Logistical Battalion. Representatives of the 2d ALC have indicated, however, that repair parts are not likely to be available to the 22d Logistical Battalion until 30 June 1970.

(e) A shortage of printing material, paper, ink and chemical developer offset fluid, exists in the 22d Division. Requisitions have been submitted and action has been initiated on a regular basis; however, supplies have not been received. Full utilization of organic printing facilities at division level is not possible due to these shortages.

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## 5. (C-NOPORN) Vietnamese Naval Forces Evaluation.

### a. Introduction.

(1) This report addresses the operational effectiveness of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). The report is based on the Naval Forces Evaluation System (NFES), a subsystem of SEER.

(2) In measuring the operational effectiveness of the VNN there are three major areas of interest:

- (a) Improvement and Modernization.
- (b) Operational Performance.
- (c) Operational Results.

(3) Although unquantifiable results frequently overshadow the quantifiable ones, a general feel for the situation can be obtained by examining the factors that make up these areas.

(4) A glossary of acronyms is included at the end of the section.

### b. Summary of Performance.

#### (1) Effectiveness.

(a) Craft turnovers are on schedule.

(b) Supply center performance is satisfactory.

(c) The VNN measure of effort (craft employment) met the desired standards during the quarter with the exception of the river assault craft. The assault craft continued to recover from combat damage sustained on operations during the latter part of 4th Quarter 1969. The performance indicators, which depict effective craft employment, tended to be high during the quarter reflecting the VNN's aggressiveness on the small scale operations conducted.

(d) The VNN assumed command of operation Tran Hung Dao I along the Cambodian border during the quarter. Three of the major operations are now commanded by VNN officers and all operations are scheduled to be turned over to VNN commanders by November 1970.

(e) Operational results were lower than last quarter due primarily to operations being conducted on a smaller scale.

#### (2) Problem Areas.

(a) Forces are short of officers and petty officers because of the rapid expansion of the VNN. Corrective programs will alleviate the officer shortage by December 1970. The most severe problem in this middle

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management area is the shortage of qualified petty officers. Preliminary actions to solve the petty officer shortage have included increasing the capacity of the petty officer classes in Saigon, shifting gunners mate and bosun mate petty officer schools to Cam Ranh Bay and better identification of personnel available for schooling incident to promotions. These programs, plus others being developed, should provide 90 percent of the required petty officer strength by the end of CY 71.

(b) Civilian repair facilities and shipyard strengths remain below a satisfactory level. The personnel allowance has been increased and a wage increase was approved; however, the Vietnamese government has frozen the civilian work force at 2205 personnel.

(c) A recruiting shortfall of 31 percent has been experienced due to a delay in recruiting authorization from JGS. This has been reflected in shortfalls in other training programs. Upon approval of the new authorization the recruiting and training programs should return to their normal schedule.

c. Improvement and Modernization.

(1) Improvement and modernization will be measured by examining:

- (a) Craft Inventories.
- (b) Personnel Strengths.
- (c) Training.
- (d) Logistics.

(2) Craft Inventories.


(a) Actual and planned VNN combat and logistics lift craft inventories are shown in Table 2. Craft assets are made available to the VNN through Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) deliveries and through turnover of in-country USN assets. The craft turnover is on schedule.

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Chart 58

**USN CRAFT TURNED OVER TO VNN  
(CUMULATIVE SINCE JAN. 1969)**



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**CONFIDENTIAL****TABLE 2****ACTUAL AND PLANNED VNN CRAFT INVENTORIES**

CATEGORY	END OF CY 69	ON HAND 31 MAR 70	PROGRAMMED CY 70	ULTIMATE
Coastal Surveillance				
PC, PCE, PGM, MSC	30	30	32	32
PCF, WPB	41	58	88	95
JUNKS	226	226	240	240
DER/WHEC	0	0	1	4
River Security/Interdiction				
PBR	88	88	248	250
MLMS/LCMM	16	16	16	16
LSSL/LSIL	11	11	11	11
Escort Craft	28	28	28	28
River Assault/Interdiction				
RAG Craft	202	202	202	202
RAID Craft	108	108	185	189
Logistic Lift				
LST, LSM, LCU, YOG, AKL	20	22	25	30
Total Craft	770	789	1,076	1,097


(b) Chart 58 shows the cumulative craft turnovers to the VNN since 1 January 1969. During the first quarter 1970 nineteen craft were added to the VNN inventory. During the second quarter 277 craft are scheduled to be turned over to the VNN bringing the cumulative craft turnover to 494 since 1 January 1969.

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Chart 59

**VNN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED**



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(3) Personnel Strength. Chart 59 shows the VNN personnel strength expansion from first quarter 1969. The personnel strength is 33,927 and is composed of 2,015 officers, 6,439 petty officers and 25,473 enlisted. The number of personnel in the pipeline (12,648) is still high due primarily to personnel in training.

(a) Ship, craft, and support activity personnel manning levels are displayed in Table 3 as percentages of TOE allowances.

TABLE 3  
PERSONNEL MANNING LEVELS

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>AS OF 31 MAR 70</u>
-----------------	------------------------

Coastal Surveillance

Officer	50%
PO	42%
Enlisted	124%
TOTAL	90%

River Security/Interdiction

Officer	65%
PO	23%
Enlisted	97%
TOTAL	70%

River Assault/Interdiction

Officer	74%
PO	41%
Enlisted	104%
TOTAL	83%

Logistic Lift

Officer	81%
PO	48%
Enlisted	99%
TOTAL	83%

Pipeline, Training  
Facilities & Support  
Activities

Officer	92%
PO	163%
Enlisted	135%
TOTAL	140%

Civilian Repair 64%

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(b) All categories are short of officers and petty officers except the last category which consists primarily of pipeline personnel.

(c) Officer strength will reach a satisfactory level in December 1970. The most severe middle management problem in the VNN is the shortage of qualified petty officers. A recent VNN proposal made to the JGS recommended specific alterations to the promotion system that would make it more responsive to VNN needs. Stronger programs to increase petty officer procurement are being developed. The new programs include night school, better distribution of the training load to the training centers and better identification of personnel available for schooling incident to promotion. These programs should improve the petty officer strength situation to the extent that 90% petty officer strength should be attained by the end of CY 1971.

(d) Civilian Repair Facility and shipyard strengths remain below a satisfactory level. The shipyard civilian personnel allowance was increased to 3110 during early 1970 and the Minister of Defense approved a wage increase to stimulate recruiting of the additional personnel. However, during the month of March the Vietnamese Government froze the shipyard civilian work force at 2205 personnel. Until the shipyard is permitted to recruit again, strength levels will remain below a satisfactory level.

(4) Training. Training programs to support asset turnover and to upgrade the competence level of the VNN are on schedule; deviations remain within acceptable limits. Cumulative inputs to these programs, as percentages of the number of personnel programmed to start training, are shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

TRAINING

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>1 APR CUMULATIVE CY 70 INPUTS</u>
Recruit	69%
Basic Specialist	111%
Advanced Specialist	134%
Petty Officer	25%
Midshipmen	98%
Warrant Officers	145%
English School	82%
Boat School	*
On-the-Job Training, Crew	130%
On-the-Job Training, Other than Crew	78%
Off-Shore (Outside the Country)	97%

\*No inputs programmed

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(a) The recruiting shortfall of 31% was the result of a recruiting authorization delay from JGS to Phase III Improvement and Modernization manpower ceiling increases. Authorization from JGS to resume recruiting was received and it is expected that recruiting will be back on schedule by April 1970.

(b) One thousand ten petty officer candidates were programmed for the first quarter CY 70. Two hundred forty-eight was the cumulative input for the quarter. Classes at Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon for February and March did not commence due to the non-availability of students.

(c) An 86 man shortfall in English Language School input resulted from a shortage of available recruit graduates and is attributed to the time lag that resulted while waiting for JGS approval of the recruiting authorization.

(d) The 351 man OJT (except crew) shortfall consists of 151 USN OJT programmed spaces and 200 unfilled maintenance spaces in the Combat Craft Orientation School. Not enough recruits finished recruit training to meet all the on-the-job training requirements, "A" school needs, and various other training programs.


(e) Chart 60 shows the average monthly inputs, outputs and number of personnel in training during the quarter. The programmed goals were not met due primarily to the shortage of recruits and the lack of input to the petty officer training program.

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Chart 60

**VNN TRAINING**



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(5) Logistics.

(a) Logistics performances will be measured by examining:

- 1 Supply Performance.
- 2 Transportation Performance.
- 3 Craft Availability.

(b) Supply Center Performance. VNN Supply Center performance data and standards established for RIMMS are listed in Table 5. Customer satisfaction is a measure of ability to fill requisitions from the center's load list. Demand accomodation measures the validity of the Supply Center's load list. Rejection rate is the percent of requisitions which were incomplete or improperly submitted and therefore rejected. Taken together the indicators reveal that the Supply Center has a valid load list and is able to meet customer demands.

TABLE 5

SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS

<u>INDICATOR</u>	<u>DESIRED</u>	<u>SATISFACTORY</u>	<u>31 MAR 70</u>
Customer Satisfaction	70%	60%	69.1%
Stockage Satisfaction	85%	75%	88.6%
Demand Accomodation	90%	75%	78.0%
Requisition Rejection Rate	10%	15%	6.4%

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(c) Transportation Performance. The number of tons of cargo and POL lifted by the logistics flotilla and the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization System desired standard are shown on Chart 61. The desired standard is based on average capacities and a 70% utilization of craft. In September 1969 the desired standard was raised from 39,000 tons to 42,000 tons due to the addition of an LST to the logistic lift craft assets. Although craft availability and employment have been high, inefficient scheduling and cargo handling have resulted in the standards not being met. The Joint General Staff (JGS) has been assigned scheduling control of most of the major logistic craft. The VNN logistic flotilla commander notifies the JGS when a craft is available for a mission. JGS then schedules a cargo lift mission. This short notice practice has resulted in inefficient utilization of assets, short loading, and no backloading of cargo for the return trip to Saigon.

(d) Craft Availability. Availability is a gross measure of VNN ability in craft maintenance and supply of spare parts. Since the USN and VNN presently have a single logistics tail, and USN facilities are responsible for the support of VNN craft until the turnover of all repair facilities in FY 72, the indicator is currently a measure of the combined effort to maintain PCFs, PBRs and RAC. Since VNN facilities maintain the older craft, the indicator is a truer measure of strictly VNN capability for those craft.

1 If a craft is capable of getting underway, it is considered available. The indicator does not measure the operability of armament, communication equipment, or auxillary engineering equipment.

2 The availability of selected craft is shown on Chart 62.

a PCF/WPB availability met the desired standard during the quarter. During the first portion of the quarter the availability was above the desired standard. During March five boats went into overhaul causing the quarterly average available to drop to 90 percent. These five boats had been on a severe operating schedule in the An Thoi area the past five months and their overhaul periods were delayed to meet operational commitments.

b PBR availability remained high throughout the quarter. RPG detachments have been successfully employed in locations remote from their maintenance bases and have been able to maintain their high availability.

c RAID and RAG craft remain below their desired availability resulting from their slow recovery from the battle damage suffered during the operations conducted in the U Minh area during November.


d Logistic lift craft continued to be above the standard. Inefficient craft scheduling by JGS provides more time in port for these units. Routine maintenance and upkeep during the report periods is a contributing factor to the availability of these craft.

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Chart 61

**LOGISTICS LIFT CRAFT RESULTS  
TONS OF CARGO AND POL TRANSPORTED**



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

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

Chart 62

**CRAFT AVAILABILITY**



**PCF/WPB & PBR**



**RAID & RAG**



**LOGISTIC LIFT**



--- DESIRED AVAILABILITY

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## d. Operational Performance.

(1) Operational performance will be measured by examining:

(a) Craft Employment.

(b) Performance Indicators.

(2) Craft Employment. Employment is a measure of the VNN level of activity. A craft is employed if it gets underway. A fleet command ship, however, is considered employed the entire time it is deployed from Saigon, even if in port. The indicator does not reveal whether or not the unit was gainfully employed. It must be used in conjunction with advisor reports and the performance indicators. Charts 63 and 64 show the quarterly craft employment statistics for 1969 and first quarter 1970.

(a) The standards for employment were based, for older craft, upon past VNN performance, and for newer assets, such as PCF, PBR and RAC on past USN performance.

(b) Coastal surveillance craft employment increased over last quarter due to an increase in the number of Market Time stations patrolled by the VNN. Employment was not up to the desired level due to four of the An Thoi PCFs going into a long overdue overhaul and a portion of the smaller craft employment being hindered by inclement weather. The VNN continue to meet their operational commitments as they assume more of the coastal surveillance responsibility.

(c) River security craft employment remained above the desired standard. PBR employment continues to be high even though some of the craft are deployed to locations remote from their home base.

(d) River assault craft employment is still below the desired standard. Employment during January was low as the units continued to recover from the battle damage suffered during the U Minh operation in 4th quarter 1969. During February the assault craft were within three percent of their desired standard, however during March combat damage resulting from operations in the U Minh area again lowered the employment for the month. The overall effect lowered the employment for the quarter.

(e) A logistic lift craft is employed if it is loading, unloading or underway. Similar to the logistic craft availability, in the absence of a firm employment schedule, the indicator is somewhat invalid as a true measure of the ability to meet their employment schedule.

(3) Performance Indicators. The four indicators listed in Table 6 have been developed to give an indication of the performance and readiness of the three major VNN operating groups. These indicators have been normalized (averaged over all craft in a specific group). Bias still remains, for example, one division of boats operating in a high risk area versus one in a low risk area. As a result the numbers have meaning only when compared to a standard.

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
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Chart 63


**VIETNAMESE NAVAL CRAFT EMPLOYMENT**

**COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CRAFT**


**1969**




**1970**



**RIVER SECURITY CRAFT**



200  
150  
100  
50  
0



— — — — ASSIGNED ■ EMPLOYED ▶ DESIRED EMPLOYMENT

113

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
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Chart 64


**VIETNAMESE NAVAL CRAFT EMPLOYMENT**

**RIVER ASSAULT CRAFT**


**1969**



**1970**



**LOGISTICS LIFT CRAFT**




**40**

**30**

**20**

**10**

**0**



**----- ASSIGNED**

**■ EMPLOYED**

**► DESIRED EMPLOYMENT**

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The standard values were computed from historical data obtained on USN units operating in the three major operating groups. An expanded data base is being compiled to give more meaningful standards considering present operations. All four indicators must be used conjointly and subjected to a value judgement to obtain a relative picture of VNN performance and readiness. The data is taken from VNN operational summaries, USN spot reports, and advisor spot reports. Although these indicators were chosen as possible comparison measures they often have little meaning because the VNN craft in Market Time, for example, have had less than one percent of the opportunity to get in fire-fights than USN PCF in river operations have had. In operations such as Giant Slingshot, where VNN river patrol groups are integrated with USN river divisions, it is difficult to see any differences in readiness and training of the two navies.

TABLE 6  
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

<u>Indicator</u>	<u>Standard</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>
<u>Coastal Divisions</u>				
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.03	0	.05	0
Incidents per Unit	.54	.07	.12	.07
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.10	0	.02	0
Enemy KIA per Unit	.26	0	0	.07
<u>River Patrol Groups</u>				
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.37	.02	.02	.01
Incidents per Unit	.85	.47	.32	.53
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.15	0	.09	.05
Enemy KIA per Unit	.52	.30	.02	.14
<u>River Assault &amp; Interdiction Divisions</u>				
Boats Damaged/Destroyed per Unit	.27	.06	.01	.15
Incidents per Unit	.17	.34	.23	.19
Friendly Casualties per Unit	.27	0	.05	.31
Enemy KIA per Unit	.22	.34	.28	.07


(a) Coastal Divisions. The VNN presently has three coastal flotillas divided into six coastal squadrons deployed on Market Time patrols. The VNN controls 48 of the 58 coastal surveillance stations as indicated on Charts 65 and 66. Market Time patrol operations are relatively quiet in comparison to Sea Lords' interdiction operations. Inasmuch as only a few VNN PCFs are assigned to Sea Lords the readiness and performance indicators show a large disparity from the arbitrary standard, which is based on all PCF operations. In the future VNN PCFs will be playing a larger part in Sea Lords operations and a more apt picture will be presented by the readiness and performance indicators.

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
Chart 65

**MARKET TIME SURVEILLANCE STATIONS**



1969

 VNN



1970

 USN


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Chart 66

**MARKET TIME SURVEILLANCE STATIONS**



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(b) River Patrol Groups. There are four VNN River Patrol Groups (RPG) with approximately 20 PBRs per group. RPG 51 and 52 are employed in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) and Soi Rap River with the vital job of protecting shipping. Recently a detachment of RPG 51 has been assigned to the Ready Deck area of operations. RPG 55 is employed in the Giant Slingshot operation. At the beginning of the year RPG 54 had 10 boats each in the Tran Hung Dao I operation and on the Bassac River. During J-War the 10 RPG 54 boats on the Bassac River were redeployed to the Tran Hung Dao I operation along the Cambodian border. This shifting of units into areas of higher enemy activity is reflected in the first quarter's monthly indicators.

(c) River Assault and Interdiction Divisions. There are six RAIDs consisting of approximately 18 boats per division. At the beginning of the year four of these RAIDs were part of ATF 211 operating in the U Minh area and two RAIDs were assigned to the Giant Slingshot operation. During March one RAID from ATF 211 was shifted to the Search Turn operation and operated with the USN units for the remainder of the quarter. The level of activity for the RAID craft dropped off from last quarter, however, the performance indicators show that the units continued to achieve results. The friendly casualty indicator was high and this is reflected in the kill ratio being slightly lower than last quarter.

e. Area of Operational Responsibility. Chart 67 shows the locations of the various naval operations that are commanded by USN and VNN and unilateral USN operations. The combined operations join USN and VNN personnel in the same staff and fighting effort with the VNN eventually assuming total control of these operations. During the quarter the VNN assumed command of Tran Hung Dao I. Three of the seven operations are now commanded by Vietnamese officers with USN deputy commanders. Operations Breezy Cove and Barrier Reef are unilateral USN operations. Breezy Cove was a joint operation at the beginning of the year but deployment of the VNN gunfire support units to the VNN commanded Tran Hung Dao now makes Breezy Cove a unilateral USN operation.

f. Operational Results.


(1) Operational results attained by the VNN during the four quarters of 1969 and the first quarter 1970 are shown on Chart 68. The number of coastal craft searched in the Market Time operation has dropped slightly due to inclement weather along portions of the coast preventing the smaller aircraft from deploying. Enemy and VNN craft captured, destroyed and damaged dropped during the quarter primarily because of smaller scale operations upon termination of ATF 211's operation in the U Minh area. The number of enemy killed also decreased as a result of the smaller scale operations. The kill ratio, though less than last quarter, still remains high.

(2) Chart 69 is a comparison of the USN/VNN results for CY 69 and first quarter 1970. High US results include efforts of US air support of USN and VNN waterborne operations. This display indicates the total effort necessary on the part of the Vietnamese, assuming the current level of fighting continues.

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Chart 67



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
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Chart 68


**VIETNAMESE NAVY RESULTS**

**ENEMY-VNN CRAFT CAPTURED, DESTROYED, AND DAMAGED**

**1969**



**1970**





**ENEMY**

**VNN**

**• DATA NOT AVAILABLE**


**ENEMY-VNN KIA**




**ENEMY**

**VNN**

**COASTAL CRAFT SEARCHED**



400  
(THOUSAND)





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

Chart 69

VNN-USN RESULTS COMPARISON



ENEMY CRAFT CAPTURED, DESTROYED, AND DAMAGED



ENEMY KIA



COASTAL CRAFT SEARCHED



■ BY USN

▨ BY VNN

\* DATA NOT AVAILABLE

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## GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACTOVLOG	Accelerated Turnover Logistics Program
AKL	Attack Cargo, Light
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
ATG	Amphibious Task Group
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
CZ	Coastal Zone
DER	Destroyer Escort, Radar
JGS	Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
LCMM	Landing Craft, Mechanized, Minesweeper
LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized
LCM-8	Landing Craft, Mechanized Mark 8 (Large LCM)
LCU	Landing Craft, Utility
LSIL	Landing Ship, Infantry, Large
LSSL	Landing Ship, Support, Large
LSM	Landing Ship, Medium
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MLMS	Motor Launch Mine Sweeper
OJT	On the Job Training
PBR	Patrol Boat River
PC	Patrol Craft
PCE	Patrol Craft, Escort
PCF	Patrol Craft, Fast
PGM	Patrol Motor Gunboat
RAC	River Assault Craft
RAG	River Assault Group
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division
RPG	River Patrol Group
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
TF	Task Force
TG	Task Group
WHEC	High Endurance Coast Guard Cutter
WPB	Coast Guard Patrol Boat
YOG	Coastal Oiler
YTL	Medium Yard Tug

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ANNEX A

Enemy Contacts and Results Per Bn

Results per battalion in terms of hours of contact and enemy KIA per hour of contact are shown in this annex for each major organization, by mission. For hours of contact all contacts were converted to contact with the equivalent of an enemy platoon, by multiplying company contacts by three and battalion contacts by nine. Where mission headings are omitted, there were no enemy contacts while on that mission.

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I CORPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	EN PLT EQUIV HRS OF CONTACT	EN KIA PER PLT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT
--------------------------	-----------------------------	------------------------------------

01 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS	423	1.40
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	1	0.00
TOTAL	424	1.40

02 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS	1020	0.84
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	7	0.29
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	19	0.95
TOTAL	1046	0.83

51 REG

COMBAT OPERATIONS	56	2.23
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	12	0.67
TOTAL	68	1.96

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II CORPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	EN PLT EQUIV HRS OF CONTACT	EN KIA PER PLT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT
-----------------------------	--------------------------------	---------------------------------------

22 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS	11	1.00
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	39	2.82
PACIFICATION STATIC	51	3.65
SECURITY	4	0.00
TOTAL	105	2.92

23 DIV

COMBAT OPERATIONS	53	0.68
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	28	0.46
PACIFICATION STATIC	11	0.73
SECURITY	26	0.15
TOTAL	118	0.52

42 REG

COMBAT OPERATIONS	9	2.78
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	3	0.33
TOTAL	12	2.17

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III CORPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	EN PLT EQUIV HRS OF CONTACT	EN KIA PER PLT EQUIV HR OF CCNTACT
<b>05 DIV</b>		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	150	1.39
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	29	0.28
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>1.21</b>
<b>18 DIV</b>		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	224	1.30
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	3	1.67
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	10	0.70
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>1.28</b>
<b>25 DIV</b>		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	119	2.78
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	112	1.97
PACIFICATION STATIC	22	1.27
SECURITY	4	1.75
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>257</b>	<b>2.28</b>

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IV CORPS

ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	EN PLT EQUIV HRS OF CONTACT	EN KIA PER PLT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT
<b>C7 DIV</b>		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	426	0.99
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	2	1.50
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>428</b>	<b>0.99</b>
<b>C9 DIV</b>		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	407	1.65
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	7	1.71
PACIFICATION STATIC	2	0.00
SECURITY	10	1.60
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>426</b>	<b>1.64</b>
<b>21 DIV</b>		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	1437	0.28
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	10	7.20
PACIFICATION STATIC	6	0.00
SECURITY	1	2.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1454</b>	<b>0.33</b>

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## ENEMY CONTACTS AND RESULTS

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION	EN PLT EQUIV HRS OF CONTACT	EN KIA PER PLT EQUIV HR OF CONTACT
<b>CV TOTALS</b>		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	1526	0.47
PACIFICATION ACTIVE	60	0.23
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	122	0.59
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1708</b>	<b>0.47</b>
<b>RN TOTALS</b>		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	1241	1.00
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY	163	0.22
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1404</b>	<b>0.91</b>
<b>AB DIV</b>		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	1123	0.52
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1123</b>	<b>0.52</b>
<b>VNMC</b>		
COMBAT OPERATIONS	313	1.41
PACIFICATION ACTIVE		
PACIFICATION STATIC		
SECURITY		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>313</b>	<b>1.41</b>

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ANNEX B

Enemy Initiated Incidents and Results

Shown in this annex by division and separate regiment are the numbers of enemy initiated incidents by type, whether day or night, and the resulting numbers of friendly or enemy KIAs; friendly WIA, MIA or captured; and weapons captured or lost.

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ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS										
	INCID DL N	EN KIA DL N		FR KIA DL N		FRIENDLY WIA/MIA/CAPT		WEAPONS LOST CAPT		
1ST DIV		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2D DIV		0	1	0	12	0	13	32	0	6
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	2	0	5	0	1	0	2	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
51ST REGT		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ASSAULT	1	0	0	0	8	0	3	0	5	0
AMBUSH	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	3	0	0	0	1	0	5	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS										
	INCID DL N	EN KIA DL N		FR KIA DL N		FRIENDLY WIA/MIA/CAPT		WEAPONS LOST CAPT		
22D DIV		0	1	0	11	0	4	6	0	5
ASSAULT	2	2	0	2	0	1	3	7	2	0
AMBUSH	2	5	0	0	1	1	2	15	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23D DIV		1	7	0	12	1	16	26	0	9
ASSAULT	4	0	0	0	4	0	8	0	2	0
AMBUSH	5	15	0	2	0	0	1	4	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
42D REGT		6	0	23	0	0	0	4	0	5
ASSAULT	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	3	7	0	0	1	3	15	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID DL N	EN KIA DL N		FR KIA DL N		FRIENDLY WIA/MIA/CAPT		WEAPONS LOST CAPT	
5TH DIV									
ASSAULT	0	1	0	8	0	1	6	0	0
AMBUSH	4	0	0	0	3	0	13	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	1	0	0	0	4	5	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18TH DIV									
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25TH DIV									
ASSAULT	0	3	0	4	0	1	1	0	0
AMBUSH	0	2	0	4	0	1	1	0	1
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
	INCID DL N	EN KIA DL N		FR KIA DL N		FRIENDLY WIA/MIA/CAPT		WEAPONS LOST CAPT	
7TH DIV									
ASSAULT	2	0	3	0	2	0	16	0	0
AMBUSH	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
ATTACK BY FIRE	0	10	0	0	0	1	2	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9TH DIV									
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	1	7	7	0	0	0	6	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21ST DIV									
ASSAULT	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	1	0	0	0	1	0	5	0	1
ATTACK BY FIRE	2	3	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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		ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
		INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
		DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT		LOST	CAPT
AIRBORNE											
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	1	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAVALRY											
ASSAULT	0	2	0	17	0	5	20	0	0	0	14
AMBUSH	5	2	57	0	3	4	16	0	0	0	9
ATTACK BY FIRE	37	7	17	0	4	2	38	0	0	0	13
TERR/SABOTAGE	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RANGERS											
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	1	2	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	4	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

		ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS									
		INCID		EN KIA		FR KIA		FRIENDLY		WEAPONS	
		DL	N	DL	N	DL	N	WIA/MIA/CAPT		LOST	CAPT
MARINES											
ASSAULT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AMBUSH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATTACK BY FIRE	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
TERR/SABOTAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HARASSMENT MIL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ASSAULT											
AMBUSH											
ATTACK BY FIRE											
TERR/SABOTAGE											
HARASSMENT MIL											

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## ANNEX C

### Effort, Results and Caches Discovered

1. Distribution of effort as shown in this annex is the percent of time spent on the different types of operations by divisions and separate battalions. Distribution of effort is based on the actual number of battalion days spent on each type of operation, against the number of battalion days available. The following definitions apply to the operations as used in this annex:

a. Combat Operations. Operations conducted to find, fix and destroy enemy forces, and to find and destroy his equipment, base areas and lines of communications.

b. Security Operations. Operations conducted to deny enemy access or damage to friendly political, economic, and military resources and installations, other than those specifically designated with the pacification program.

c. Pacification Active. Operations conducted by a unit under OPCON of a sector commander for support of pacification, to seek out and destroy or neutralize enemy forces which threaten the population or resources of the assigned pacification area. (Includes reconnaissance in force, direct attack against located enemy forces, cordon and search operations, long range patrols and ambushes.)

d. Pacification Static. Operations conducted by a unit under OPCON of a sector commander for support of pacification, to deny enemy access to protected areas where pacification is in progress, and to prevent enemy action against the population or resources within the pacification areas. (Includes outposts, patrols, and strong points within or in the immediate vicinity of protected areas.) This category also includes reserve, training and rehabilitation while the unit is formally assigned in support of pacification.

e. Reserve (Other than support of pacification). Maneuver units, including alerted but not committed reaction forces, are in reserve when so designated by the appropriate commander and not otherwise employed.

f. Training. Those missions in which forces are involved in training.

g. Rehabilitation. Time spent restoring a unit's physical and mental strength with rest and resupply.

2. Pages C-1 to C-18 contain tabulations for distribution of effort (combat, security, pacification active, pacification static, reserve, training and rehabilitation), friendly and enemy KIAs, enemy captured or surrendered, weapons captured versus lost, and caches, as reported by all ARVN/VNMC organizations. Page C-18 contains tabulations for distribution for the 4th Qtr CY 69 and the 1st Qtr CY 70 by major ARVN/VNMC organizations.

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1 CORPS 02 INFANTRY DIVISION		EFFORT		RESULTS		CACHES		100		100		100		100	
		UNITS		PCT TIME		PCT TIME		ENEMY		FRIENDLY		KIA		WEAPONS	
		CBT OPS		SECURITY		PAC		KIA		KIA		RATIO		FOOD	
						ACTIVE		STATIC		CRYPTO		SURV		WEAPONS	
INF REGT RATINGS															
04 REGT	65.28	34.72	.00			383	.00	244	.24	9.3/1	.68	1	126	0	29
05 REGT	58.33	3.06	6.17					246	.27	9.1/1	.19	1	110	6	20
06 REGT	57.22	6.94	.00									1	66	0	35
INF BN RATINGS															
001 BN 04 REGT	72.22	27.78	.00			36		35	.4	1.9/1	.6	0	15	0	2
002 BN 04 REGT	54.44	54.44	.00					138	.7	8.8/1	.25	0	12	0	5
003 BN 04 REGT	74.44	25.56	.00					174	.11	19.7/1	.22	1	41	0	21
004 BN 04 REGT	68.85	31.11	.00					16.67	.00	15.8/1	.15	0	58	0	1
001 BN 05 REGT	55.56	12.22				59		13		4.5/1	3	0	14	6	0
002 BN 05 REGT	71.11	.00				112		3		37.3/1	3	0	33	0	4
003 BN 05 REGT	31.11	.00						50		7.7/1	0	0	5	0	2
004 BN 05 REGT	75.56	.00						98		10.0/1	17	0	58	0	7
001 BN 06 REGT	41.11	3.32	.00					25		12.3/1	4	0	12	0	20
002 BN 06 REGT	55.56	4.44	.00					68		13.6/1	11	1	9	0	5
003 BN 06 REGT	63.32	6.67	.00					55			4	0	16	0	0
004 BN 06 REGT	68.85	13.32	.00					55		16.3/1	0	0	29	0	1
AVERAGE	60.27	14.50	1.38					72.7		7.6	9.4/1	.9	25.1	.5	7.0
															7.6

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1 CORPS 51 INFANTRY REGIMENT		EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES			
UNITS	PCT TIME C8T OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME PAC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	ENEMY KIA RATIO	WEAPONS CPTD SURR	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	100 LBS FOOD	100 LBS AMMO
INF REGT RATINGS											
51 REGT	42.50	48.85	.00	.00	133	57	2.3/1	51	4	56	5
INF BN RATINGS											
C01 BN 51 REGT	24.44	52.22	.00	.00	40	15	2.7/1	18	0	15	0
C02 BN 51 REGT	44.44	44.44	.00	.00	19	5	3.8/1	21	1	23	0
C03 BN 51 REGT	50.00	50.00	.00	.00	64	18	3.6/1	12	3	18	0
C04 BN 51 REGT	48.85	48.85	.00	.00	10	19	0.5/1	0	0	5	0
AVERAGE	42.50	48.85	.00	.00	33.2	14.2	2.33/1	12.7	1.0	14.0	1.2

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C-5	INF BN	INF BN RATINGS	EFFECT			RESULTS			CACHES				
			UNITS	PCT TIME CBT GPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURV	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS WEAPONS
40 REGT	40 REGT	3.23	2.5C	20.28	60.56	93	26	3.6/1	34	62	35	4	3
41 REGT	41 REGT	3.00	6.35	45.0C	46.94	177	27	6.6/1	17	3	68	7	53
47 REGT	47 REGT	16.67	15.0C	41.67	8.89	37	8	4.6/1	2	0	16	0	3
AVERAGE	AVERAGE	6.65	7.56	35.64	36.79	25.5	5.0	5.03/1	4.4	5.4	9.9	.9	4.9
											11.0	.3	

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2 CORPS 23 INFANTRY DIVISION			EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES		
UNITS	PCT TIME C87 GPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	ENEMY RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURV	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS FOOD
INF REGT RATINGS	44 REGT	45 REGT	33.61	10.28	0.00	23	7	3.3/1	6	26	0
001 BN 44 REGT	43.61	24.72	25.56	13.33	12.78	28	19	1.5/1	9	25	0
002 BN 44 REGT	40.00	29.17	16.94	8.61	10	19	0.5/1	7	0	5	12
INF BN RATINGS										31	45
001 BN 44 REGT	10.28	41.11	41.44	42.22	0.00	4	2	2.0/1	0	11	0
002 BN 44 REGT	27.78	43.33	43.33	43.33	0.00	10	1	10.0/1	1	5	0
003 BN 44 REGT	52.32	83.23	83.23	83.23	0.00	1	2	0.5/1	3	0	0
004 BN 44 REGT	83.23	14.44	14.44	14.44	0.00	6	2	4.0/1	2	7	0
001 BN 45 REGT	16.67	15.56	15.56	53.33	0.00	2	1	2.0/1	0	2	0
002 BN 45 REGT	37.78	2.22	2.22	0.00	51.11	12	14	0.9/1	0	7	0
003 BN 45 REGT	35.56	28.89	28.89	0.00	0.00	12	4	3.0/1	0	0	0
004 BN 45 REGT	8.89	95.56	95.56	0.00	0.00	2	0	0	0	15	0
001 BN 53 REGT	8.85	41.11	15.56	34.44	0	5	0	0	0	1	3
002 BN 53 REGT	56.67	34.44	34.44	0.00	0.00	8	0	0	0	0	0
003 BN 53 REGT	57.78	30.00	30.00	0.00	0.00	0	1	0	0	0	0
004 BN 53 REGT	36.67	45.56	17.78	17.78	0.00	2	13	0.2/1	0	1	12
AVERAGE	36.11	31.11	13.51	7.12	5.0	3.7	1.35/1	1.8	0	4.6	1.0
										3.4	62.0
											.8

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CORPS	42 INFANTRY REGIMENT	EFFECT										RESULTS						CACHES			
		UNITS	PCT TIME CAT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY	WEAPONS	CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	CPTD SURV	WEAPONS LOST	WEAPONS	100 LBS LBS	100 LBS AMMO	FOOD		
IF REGT RATINGS																					
42 REGT	30.56	51.35	46.67	.00	26	6	4.3/1	0	0	5	0	50	3	23							
F	BN	RATINGS																			
1	BN 42 REGT	41.11	35.56	4.44	.00	24	5	4.8/1	0	0	1	0	5	0	1						
2	BN 42 REGT	22.22	72.22	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
3	BN 42 REGT	27.78	42.22	12.22	.00	1	1	1.0/1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
4	BN 42 REGT	31.11	55.56	10.00	.00	1	0	10.0/1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				
AVERAGE	30.55	51.32	46.66	.00	6.5	1.5	4.33/1	.0	.0	1.2	.0	12.5	.7								

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3 CORPS 05 INFANTRY DIVISION				EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES					
UNITS	PCT TIME	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	WEAPONS CAPTURED	WEAPONS LOST	100 LBS AMMO	100 LBS FOOD						
<b>INF REGT RATINGS</b>																	
07 REGT	65.83	3.33	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	65	18	3.6/1	9	0	37	5	1	27	3
08 REGT	61.94	25.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	72	18	4.0/1	9	14	62	2	76	6	276
09 REGT	88.60	1.17	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	116	18	6.4/1	1	0	26	0	2	132	1
<b>INF BN RATINGS</b>																	
C01 BN 07 REGT	92.22	2.22	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	6	6	1.0/1	3	0	3	0	0	0	0
C02 BN 07 REGT	88.89	3.33	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	14	4	3.5/1	2	0	6	0	0	1	0
C03 BN 07 REGT	88.89	4.44	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	23	5	4.6/1	3	0	14	0	0	1	0
CC4 BN 07 REGT	73.33	3.33	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	22	3	7.3/1	1	0	14	5	1	25	3
C01 BN 08 REGT	74.44	10.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	26	4	8.7/1	2	0	22	0	56	1	240
C02 BN 08 REGT	77.78	1.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	18	4	4.5/1	6	13	2	15	4	36	0
C03 BN C8 REGT	63.33	23.33	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	25	6	4.2/1	3	6	23	0	0	0	0
C04 BN 08 REGT	22.22	66.67	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	3	5	0.6/1	0	2	4	0	7	1	0
C01 BN 09 REGT	86.67	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	50	1	50.0/1	0	0	4	0	0	0	0
CC2 BN 09 REGT	87.50	1.35	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	5	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
C03 BN 09 REGT	88.89	3.33	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	59	15	3.9/1	1	0	19	0	2	132	0
CC4 BN 09 REGT	91.11	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	2	2	1.0/1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
<b>AVERAGE</b>				78.62	9.58	.00	.00	21.0	4.5	4.68/1	1.5	1.1	10.4	.5	6.7	13.7	23.3

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		EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES			
UNITS	PCT TIME CAT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	FCT TIME ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIC	ENEMY CPTC SUPR	WEAPONS	CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	100 LBS FOOD	100 LBS AMMO
<b>INF REGT RATINGS</b>													
43 REGT	77.35	5.00	12.35	.00	162	11	14.7/1	12	0	36	0	129	14
48 REGT	75.15	16.02	.00	76	5	15.2/1	1	0	23	0	0	1	12
52 REGT	68.85	13.61	6.94	.00	66	10	6.6/1	0	0	13	0	3	113
INF BN RATINGS													
001 BN 43 REGT	67.18	.00	.00	.00	42	2	21.0/1	7	0	9	0	0	10
002 BN 43 REGT	84.44	15.56	.00	.00	70	2	35.0/1	4	0	13	0	122	3
003 BN 43 REGT	85.71	.00	.00	.00	6	5	1.2/1	0	0	12	0	0	6
004 BN 43 REGT	43.32	3.23	46.67	.00	44	2	22.0/1	1	0	2	0	7	1
001 BN 48 REGT	75.36	3.33	.00	.00	51	2	25.5/1	0	0	12	0	0	3
002 BN 48 REGT	64.28	5.30	.00	.00	16	0	0	0	0	10	0	0	10
003 BN 48 REGT	74.44	25.56	.00	.00	4	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	0
004 BN 48 REGT	70.85	18.85	.00	.00	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
C48 BN 48 REGT	66.52	35.44	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C01 BN 52 REGT	72.22	26.67	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
002 BN 52 REGT	25.56	27.78	.00	.00	18	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0
003 BN 52 REGT	76.67	.00	.00	.00	17	5	3.4/1	0	0	1	0	0	0
C04 BN 52 REGT	91.11	.00	.00	.00	13	1	13.0/1	0	0	1	0	3	2
AVERAGE	73.78	11.37	6.16	.00	23.3	2.0	11.69/1	1.0	.0	5.5	.0	10.1	9.8
													2.4

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3 CORPS 25 INFANTRY DIVISION		EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES			
UNITS	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTD SURV	WEAPONS	WEAPONS LOST	100 LBS AMMO
<b>INF REGT RATINGS</b>											
46 REGT	55.17	6.33	24.72	.00	84	12	7.0/1	12	40	4	7
49 REGT	85.64	8.66	83.06	14.44	274	23	11.9/1	75	138	35	83
50 REGT	1.67	.00			229	15	15.3/1	58	54	8	53
INF BN RATINGS											
CC1 BN 46 REGT	40.00	30.00	.00	.00	1	0		0	0	0	0
CC2 BN 46 REGT	1.11	.00	58.89	.00	37	3	12.3/1	3	23	0	14
CC3 BN 46 REGT	55.56	3.33	.00	.00	30	3	10.0/1	3	8	0	0
CO4 BN 46 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	16	6	2.7/1	6	9	4	4
CO1 BN 49 REGT	96.55	3.45	.00	.00	124	8	15.6/1	18	11	68	0
CC2 BN 49 REGT	95.56	.00	.00	.00	25	1	25.0/1	14	12	0	13
CC3 BN 49 REGT	100.00	.00	.00	.00	106	5	21.2/1	33	1	50	0
CC4 BN 49 REGT	66.67	31.11	.00	.00	19	9	2.1/1	10	0	6	1
CO1 BN 50 REGT	.00	.00	54.44	5.56	67	5	13.4/1	14	10	36	0
CO2 BN 50 REGT	.00	.00	56.67	3.33	43	3	14.3/1	8	1	17	7
CO3 BN 50 REGT	5.56	.00	73.33	21.11	42	1	42.0/1	12	9	28	0
CO4 BN 50 REGT	1.11	.00	67.78	27.78	77	6	12.8/1	24	34	46	1
AVERAGE	50.04	5.66	36.02	4.82	48.9	4.1	11.75/1	12.0	5.6	25.4	.4
										4.7	6.9 21.5

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4 CORPS OF INFANTRY DIVISION			EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES		
UNITS	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENERGY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENERGY KIA	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	WEAPONS CPTD LOST	100 LBS FOOD
INF REGT RATINGS											
10 REGT	57.1C	32.24	3.55	.00	279	47	5.9/1	113	1	51	16
11 REGT	55.0C	56.44	.00	.00	39	18	2.2/1	24	0	82	0
12 REGT	67.78	14.17	.00	.00	105	59	1.8/1	47	5	57	1
INF BN RATINGS											
C01 BN 10 REGT	51.11	25.57	.0C	.00	42	9	4.7/1	12	0	10	0
CC2 BN 10 REGT	52.22	23.33	14.44	.00	42	9	4.7/1	12	0	10	0
CC3 BN 10 REGT	58.32	36.46	.00	.00	86	8	10.8/1	50	0	17	0
004 BN 10 REGT	66.67	33.33	.00	.00	109	21	5.2/1	39	1	13	1
C01 BN 11 REGT	56.67	56.67	.0C	.00	8	6	1.3/1	3	0	11	0
CC2 BN 11 REGT	25.56	2C,CC	.0C	.00	12	0	7	0	0	7	0
003 BN 11 REGT	67.78	7.78	.0C	.00	9	9	1.0/1	4	0	5	0
CC4 BN 11 REGT	7C.0C	.0C	.00	.00	10	3	3.3/1	10	0	6	0
C01 BN 12 REGT	66.67	1C,CC	.0C	.00	19	13	1.5/1	11	2	11	0
CC2 BN 12 REGT	66.85	15.57	.00	.00	29	13	2.2/1	15	0	19	0
003 BN 12 REGT	64.44	16.85	.00	.00	28	24	1.2/1	12	1	15	1
CC4 BN 12 REGT	71.11	12.22	.0C	.00	29	9	3.2/1	9	2	12	0
AVERAGE	59.94	18.65	1.15	.00	35.2	10.3	3.41/1	15.3	.5	11.0	.1
										12.7	3.2
											8.7

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## CORPS 09 INFANTRY DIVISION

UNITS	PCT TIME CBT OPS	EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES		
		PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	ENEMY KIA RATIO	WEAPONS	CPTD LOST	WEAPONS
					ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	ENEMY KIA RATIO	CPTD SURV	CPTD LOST	WEAPONS
<b>INF REGT RATINGS</b>										
14 REGT	67.78	3.33	8.61	.56	182	50	3.6/1	57	0	48
15 REGT	77.78	.00	4.44	.00	238	11	21.6/1	0	0	44
16 REGT	56.54	.00	5.44	.00	279	63	4.4/1	40	5	67
C01 BN 14 REGT	55.56	.00	26.67	2.22	46	2	23.0/1	9	0	6
002 BN 14 REGT	78.85	.00	7.78	.00	40	18	2.2/1	8	0	17
003 BN 14 REGT	58.89	13.33	7.78	.00	60	16	3.3/1	9	0	8
C04 BN 14 REGT	77.78	.00	7.78	.00	36	12	3.0/1	31	0	17
001 BN 15 REGT	80.00	.00	82.22	.00	63	5	12.6/1	0	0	10
C02 BN 15 REGT	82.22	.00	81.11	.00	17	3	5.7/1	0	0	2
003 BN 15 REGT	81.11	.00	67.78	.00	78	2	39.0/1	0	0	20
C04 BN 15 REGT	67.78	.00	26.85	.00	17.78	80	1	80.0/1	0	0
001 BN 16 REGT	74.44	.00	74.44	.00	27	2	13.5/1	0	0	12
C02 BN 16 REGT	74.44	.00	76.67	.00	109	15	7.3/1	6	0	14
003 BN 16 REGT	76.67	.00	47.78	.00	72	24	3.0/1	16	0	24
C04 BN 16 REGT	47.78	.00	37.78	.00	71	22	3.2/1	16	3	17
AVERAGE	67.56	1.11	6.01	1.66	58.2	10.3	5.63/1	8.0	.4	13.2 1.3

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				EFFORT				RESULTS				CACHES			
UNITS	PCT TIME CBT CPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME ACTIVE	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY WEAPONS	CPTD SUPP	CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	100 LBS	100 LBS	100 AMMO	WEAPONS	FOOD
<b>INF REGT RATINGS</b>															
31 REGT	61.94	3.61	14.44	61	65	0.9/1	17	11	42	2	3	876	16		
32 REGT	65.28	1.11	18.33	5.28	296	4.6/1	9	0	94	1	25	22	3		
33 REGT	56.29	11.33	7.73	2.45	125	1.5/1	17	0	74	51	23	26	11		
<b>INF BN RATINGS</b>															
C01 BN 31 REGT	54.44	6.67	26.67	.00	4	15	0.3/1	6	0	3	0	C	96	1	
C02 BN 31 REGT	74.44	7.76	7.76	.00	32	13	2.5/1	2	1	24	2	1	78	15	
C03 BN 31 REGT	37.76	.00	31.11	20.00	18	28	0.6/1	9	6	13	0	2	700	0	
C04 BN 31 REGT	21.11	.00	.00	.00	7	9	0.8/1	0	4	2	0	0	0	0	
C01 BN 32 REGT	67.76	.00	.00	.00	46	12	3.8/1	3	0	42	0	25	0	0	
C02 BN 32 REGT	62.42	.00	.00	.00	100	31	3.2/1	1	0	29	0	0	22	0	
C03 BN 32 REGT	.00	.00	73.33	21.11	55	2	27.5/1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	
C04 BN 32 REGT	81.11	4.44	.00	.00	95	20	4.8/1	5	0	21	1	0	0	0	
C01 BN 33 REGT	57.61	27.17	.00	.00	27	23	1.2/1	1	0	8	7	0	0	0	
C02 BN 33 REGT	71.11	8.85	.00	.00	45	41	1.1/1	0	0	34	44	1	0	0	
C03 BN 33 REGT	27.78	8.85	31.11	10.00	9	5	1.8/1	5	0	2	0	0	0	0	
C04 BN 33 REGT	16.67	.00	.00	.00	44	13	3.4/1	4	0	30	0	22	26	11	
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>61.82</b>	<b>5.36</b>	<b>13.49</b>	<b>4.25</b>	<b>40.1</b>	<b>17.6</b>	<b>2.27/1</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>.9</b>	<b>17.5</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>76.8</b>	<b>2.5</b>	

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AIRBORNE CIVISION

UNITS	EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES						
	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	FCT TIME ACTIVE	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	CPTD SURR	CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	WEAPONS	100 LBS
001 ABN EN	100.00	•CC	•00	•00	60	15	4.0/1	0	11	0	0	0	0
002 ABN BN	58.85	40.00	•00	•00	87	20	4.4/1	3	0	143	0	134	100
003 ABN EN	44.44	47.76	•00	•00	2	10	0.2/1	0	4	0	0	40	50
005 ABN BN	90.00	•00	•00	•00	48	19	2.5/1	0	0	30	0	0	22
006 ABN BN	94.44	•00	•00	•00	52	9	5.8/1	0	4	15	0	10	29
007 ABN BN	53.33	•00	•00	•00	65	14	4.6/1	2	0	19	0	0	1
008 ABN EN	55.56	•00	•00	•00	236	30	7.9/1	0	36	0	0	1074	160
009 ABN EN	41.11	13.33	•00	•00	31	4	7.8/1	1	11	0	0	0	0
011 ABN EN	17.76	•00	•3.33	•00	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
AVERAGE	70.61	11.21	7.03	•00	64.5	13.5	4.76/1	•6	•4	25.8	•0	16.0	140.7
													24.1

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UNITS	PCT TIME CBT OPS	EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES		
		PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME STATIC	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	ENEMY RATIO	CPTG SURV	WEAPONS	WEAPONS LOST
001 CAV SQDN	61.06	23.01	.00	.00	70	6	11.7/1	0	21	0
002 CAV SQDN	64.44	6.67	1.11	.00	11	4	2.8/1	8	6	0
003 CAV SQDN	8.85	85.56	.00	.00	6	3	2.6/1	0	0	1
004 CAV SQDN	30.51	.00	16.55	.00	26	4	6.5/1	0	0	0
CC5 CAV SQDN	40.00	20.00	.00	.00	35	4	8.8/1	5	15	0
006 CAV SQDN	28.85	56.67	.00	.00	16	7	2.3/1	2	26	0
CC7 CAV SQDN	90.00	10.00	.00	.00	21	1	21.0/1	0	16	0
008 CAV SQDN	5.56	91.11	.00	.00	9	0	0	4	0	0
009 CAV SQDN	94.44	.00	.00	.00	37	6	6.2/1	1	0	0
C10 CAV SQDN	92.22	.00	.00	.00	73	0	0	2	28	0
011 CAV SQDN	28.85	71.11	.00	.00	1	1	1.0/1	0	0	0
012 CAV SQDN	60.89	3.32	.00	.00	18	8	2.3/1	0	10	0
C14 CAV SQDN	21.11	68.85	.00	.00	2	0	0	0	0	0
015 CAV SQDN	49.15	30.51	5.08	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
016 CAV SQDN	51.78	.00	.00	.00	13	0	0	0	0	0
017 CAV SQDN	54.29	32.66	.00	12.86	151	5	24.4/1	5	45	0
018 CAV SQDN	78.85	.00	.00	.00	3	0	30.2/1	53	7	0
105 CAV SQDN	.00	100.00	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>56.22</b>	<b>36.10</b>	<b>1.53</b>	<b>.57</b>	<b>44.1</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>12.42/1</b>	<b>4.4</b>	<b>.5</b>	<b>12.7</b>
									<b>.3</b>	<b>10.5</b>
										<b>15.3</b>
										<b>13.7</b>

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UNITS	PCT TIME CBT OPS	PCT TIME SECURITY	PCT TIME PAC	PCT TIME STATIC	RESULTS			CACHES		
					ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY CPTC SURR	CPTD LOST	WEAPONS
C11 RANGER BN	42.32	5.56	.00	.00	77	16	4.8/1	9	0	0
021 RANGER BN	46.85	30.85	.00	.00	109	2	55.0/1	6	24	0
022 RANGER BN	12.68	1C.17	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
023 RANGER BN	21.11	34.44	.00	.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
030 RANGER BN	20.00	27.76	.00	.00	4	0	0	13	0	0
031 RANGER BN	57.78	34.44	.00	.00	1	0	0	0	5	0
032 RANGER BN	67.76	*CC	.00	.00	195	14	13.9/1	0	0	0
C33 RANGER BN	71.11	26.85	.00	.00	8	3	2.7/1	2	0	0
034 RANGER BN	23.32	66.67	.00	.00	3	1	3.0/1	0	17	0
035 RANGER BN	1.11	54.44	.00	.00	2	4	0.5/1	0	0	0
036 RANGER BN	*CC	94.44	.00	.00	12	1	12.0/1	3	0	1
C37 RANGER BN	46.67	34.44	.00	.00	199	31	6.4/1	1	12	0
C38 RANGER BN	28.89	55.56	.00	.00	10	11	0.9/1	43	1	4
C39 RANGER BN	53.32	18.85	.00	.00	264	28	9.4/1	1	0	10
041 RANGER BN	61.11	38.85	.00	.00	51	5	10.2/1	44	0	0
042 RANGER BN	60.00	4C.00	.00	.00	144	23	6.3/1	1	16	0
043 RANGER BN	70.00	30.00	.00	.00	72	10	7.2/1	0	20	1
C44 RANGER BN	74.44	25.56	.00	.00	125	13	9.6/1	0	17	6
051 RANGER BN	2.32	64.44	.00	.00	0	1	0	3	11	2
052 RANGER BN	*CC	160.00	.00	.00	1	0	0	0	1	0
<b>AVERAGE</b>	<b>41.71</b>	<b>42.73</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>63.9</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>7.84/1</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>.2</b>	<b>13.0</b>
										<b>5.6</b>

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VIE ET NAMSES MARINE DIVISION

UNITS	PCT TIME C8T GP <sub>S</sub>	PCT TIME SECURITY	FCT TIME PAC ACTIVE	FCT TIME PAC STATIC	EFFORT			RESULTS			CACHES			
					ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	ENEMY KIA	FRIENDLY KIA	KIA RATIO	CPTC SUPR	CPTD LOST	WEAPONS	
001 MARINE BN	81.11	•CC	•0C	•00	87	26	3•3/1	5	6	29	3	0	0	0
002 MARINE BN	92.22	•0C	•00	•00	75	22	3•4/1	14	3	33	0	43	30	22
003 MARINE BN	1CC.0C	•0C	•00	•00	21	14	1•5/1	14	1	12	0	0	0	20
004 MARINE BN	1CC.0C	•0C	•00	•00	87	31	2•8/1	24	0	14	7	7	2	12
005 MARINE BN	55.56	•CC	•0C	•00	43	11	3•5/1	19	2	15	0	7	2	12
006 MARINE BN	62.22	•CC	•00	•00	102	33	3•1/1	9	0	23	0	7	2	6
007 MARINE BN	66.10	•CC	•0C	•00	28	17	1•6/1	23	0	15	0	2	0	0
AVERAGE	85.04	•CC	•00	•00	63.2	22.0	2.87/1	15.2	•7	20.1	2.4	49	13	3

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## DISTRIBUTION OF EFFORT FOR 4TH &amp; 1ST QTR CY 70

ORGANIZATION	PCT TIME ON COMBAT OPS 4TH QTR 1ST QTR	PCT TIME ON SECURITY 4TH QTR 1ST QTR		PCT TIME ON PAC ACTIVE 4TH QTR 1ST QTR		PCT TIME ON PAC STATIC 4TH QTR 1ST QTR		PCT TIME ON RESERVE 4TH QTR 1ST QTR		PCT TIME ON TRAINING 4TH QTR 1ST QTR		PCT TIME ON REHABILITATION 4TH QTR 1ST QTR	
		4TH QTR	1ST QTR	4TH QTR	1ST QTR	4TH QTR	1ST QTR	4TH QTR	1ST QTR	4TH QTR	1ST QTR	4TH QTR	1ST QTR
01 DIV	72.12	78.23	17.69	13.14	.24	.00	.00	5.26	5.52	3.87	1.71	.81	1.40
02 DIV	60.03	55.79	16.67	17.09	.61	2.12	1.15	.00	11.31	11.30	8.20	9.04	2.03
51 REG	27.44	44.07	67.28	42.80	.00	.00	.00	.00	5.93	5.28	7.20	7.20	.00
1 CTZ	62.31	65.89	23.33	18.19	.34	.77	.42	.00	6.82	7.68	5.62	5.05	1.16
22 DIV	8.60	7.91	4.00	10.03	31.64	36.16	49.05	37.99	1.49	2.40	5.22	3.67	.00
23 DIV	42.68	38.84	20.39	33.47	11.65	13.42	11.31	3.11	6.78	5.03	6.03	2.68	1.15
42 REG	35.98	30.51	38.01	51.27	3.05	10.17	3.86	1.00	1.63	3.07	17.48	8.05	1.00
11 CTZ	27.12	24.39	15.88	25.97	18.99	22.70	26.42	17.62	3.77	3.77	7.32	3.87	.49
05 DIV	74.62	82.34	9.47	8.05	2.95	.00	.00	.00	2.81	.00	9.60	9.46	.55
18 CIV	52.43	76.16	36.73	11.05	33.59	1.89	.00	.00	3.39	5.02	3.06	3.78	.80
25 DIV	37.61	53.39	5.50	5.37	39.04	35.88	11.74	4.38	.20	.00	5.57	.00	1.60
III CTZ	54.80	70.58	17.39	6.13	15.16	12.69	3.90	1.47	2.14	1.81	6.04	4.71	.56
07 DIV	46.17	67.79	29.34	14.71	.41	1.82	1.56	.00	9.49	3.92	10.09	8.54	4.95
09 DIV	61.38	63.53	.95	1.69	3.12	6.07	9.35	.00	3.66	.14	11.79	10.17	9.76
21 CIV	56.29	61.28	5.07	5.16	9.47	18.75	10.69	3.67	5.14	1.90	5.49	.41	7.85
IV CTZ	55.95	65.15	11.78	7.18	4.33	8.99	7.20	1.25	1.09	1.99	9.12	6.30	7.52
INF TOTALS	50.61	58.22	17.03	14.11	9.36	10.83	6.67	4.44	4.72	3.68	7.04	5.05	2.58
CV 1 CTZ	50.42	55.93	15.89	27.54	5.93	2.12	3.81	1.27	20.76	13.14	3.18	.00	.00
CV 2 CTZ	21.17	21.67	67.83	74.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	3.95	.00	.56
CV 3 CTZ	55.33	64.75	23.04	17.97	1.41	.00	.00	.00	10.03	8.47	6.74	5.08	3.45
CV 4 CTZ	45.37	60.06	21.30	11.15	5.37	.31	2.60	.00	13.01	19.20	10.24	5.26	3.73
CV TOTALS	41.93	53.83	34.10	27.64	3.34	.58	1.62	.29	11.56	11.45	5.78	3.76	4.02
RN 1 CTZ	36.31	51.98	36.48	28.81	.00	.00	.00	.00	5.56	12.99	13.55	2.26	5.69
RN 2 CTZ	36.98	42.94	6.51	22.03	.00	.00	.00	1.50	.00	28.70	30.51	4.52	.00
RN 3 CTZ	26.92	28.06	64.23	57.06	.00	.00	.00	.00	16.36	1.69	12.99	.90	.19
RN 4 CTZ	66.99	57.97	16.10	34.24	.00	.00	.00	.00	16.91	7.80	.00	.00	.00
RN TOTALS	39.83	41.36	40.10	41.86	.00	.00	2.02	.00	9.35	9.24	7.25	6.86	1.40
AB DIV	71.27	72.32	11.02	11.49	2.80	4.90	.00	.00	5.15	8.29	3.79	.38	5.96
VMMC	75.34	86.68	.68	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	14.50	8.23	5.96	3.63	3.52
SPEC UNITS	50.13	56.50	26.50	26.62	1.59	1.01	1.30	.10	9.94	9.67	6.01	4.34	2.53
ARVN/VNMC	50.47	57.75	20.24	17.69	7.18	8.02	6.61	3.20	6.18	5.40	6.75	4.85	2.56

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ANNEX D

Advisors' Assessment Tables

These tables depict the advisors' assessment of divisions, separate regiments, and special organizations as derived from responses to the Quarterly Effectiveness Report (SEER Questionnaire as revised, effective 4th Qtr CY 69). Battalion ratings are derived from the combination of battalion and regimental advisors' assessments. The regimental ratings are derived from the combination of regimental and division advisors' assessments.

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## 01 DIVISION 1 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	UPPER EFFECT	PERS/ MURALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	95.33	76.00	95.00	84.00	80.00	68.00	92.54	92.63

## REGT HQ RATINGS

01 REGT	97.33	72.73	80.00	93.33	80.00	76.00	94.62	92.00
02 REGT	92.86	74.55	85.00	90.00	80.00	73.33	85.00	94.00
03 REGT	95.71	83.64	100.00	100.00	70.00	73.33	89.66	100.00
54 REGT	95.38	82.22	100.00	90.00	70.00	90.00	85.33	92.00
REGT HQ AVG	95.32	78.28	91.25	93.33	75.00	78.17	88.65	94.50

## INF BN RATINGS

1 BN 01 REGT	95.20	76.92	0.00	86.67	66.67	72.86	86.67	86.67
2 BN 01 REGT	81.54	73.85	0.00	51.11	66.67	69.23	71.82	76.36
3 BN 01 REGT	93.08	85.00	80.00	86.67	96.67	71.25	74.78	95.00
4 BN 01 REGT	93.33	80.00	0.00	51.11	83.33	77.78	67.74	88.33
1 BN 02 REGT	99.05	86.15	90.00	70.00	80.00	75.33	80.67	96.36
2 BN 02 REGT	82.96	89.23	0.00	80.00	70.00	50.00	66.09	76.67
3 BN 02 REGT	84.81	81.18	80.00	90.00	76.67	52.86	80.87	90.83
4 BN 02 REGT	83.08	83.64	0.00	49.09	70.00	32.86	61.74	83.33
5 BN 02 REGT	89.23	78.57	0.00	52.00	76.00	70.00	84.35	90.00
1 BN 03 REGT	98.15	89.44	100.00	86.67	88.33	75.63	87.59	100.00
2 BN 03 REGT	89.26	87.65	100.00	86.67	88.33	73.75	88.62	90.91
3 BN 03 REGT	94.44	88.24	97.50	86.67	85.00	76.88	87.24	98.18
4 BN 03 REGT	94.07	88.24	97.50	86.67	85.00	77.50	87.59	97.27
1 BN 54 REGT	85.11	85.52	95.00	100.00	72.00	62.73	75.00	83.33
2 BN 54 REGT	85.96	85.71	94.29	100.00	82.00	72.38	74.35	83.33
3 BN 54 REGT	72.00	84.00	92.00	95.00	75.00	55.00	71.49	73.33
4 BN 54 REGT	79.57	88.97	100.00	96.00	72.00	73.64	73.62	86.67
INF BN AVERAGE	88.29	84.25	60.37	79.67	78.45	67.04	77.66	88.03

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## 02 DIVISION 1 CORPS

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ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	90.00	66.32	90.00	63.33	70.00	53.33	78.57	83.16

## REGT HQ RATINGS

04 REGT	91.43	67.06	83.33	60.00	70.00	52.00	67.76	85.00
05 REGT	95.86	72.94	87.50	73.33	60.00	80.00	77.92	79.00
06 REGT	83.08	61.33	60.00	56.00	50.00	44.00	56.74	63.16
REGT HQ AVG	90.12	67.11	76.94	63.11	60.00	58.67	67.47	75.72

## INF BN RATINGS

1 BN 04 REGT	81.18	77.14	80.00	53.85	76.67	57.04	72.00	83.33
2 BN 04 REGT	62.69	68.75	70.00	45.00	61.82	40.77	57.93	55.65
3 BN 04 REGT	90.00	71.61	65.00	49.09	78.18	55.65	72.78	85.83
4 BN 04 REGT	85.56	69.38	60.00	45.45	70.91	55.38	68.00	77.50
1 BN 05 REGT	76.55	77.50	82.86	57.50	71.67	63.13	66.42	72.50
2 BN 05 REGT	91.72	85.81	87.50	62.50	70.00	69.38	78.11	84.17
3 BN 05 REGT	80.36	77.14	86.67	68.75	60.00	59.38	65.53	82.50
4 BN 05 REGT	94.74	90.32	92.50	61.25	85.00	75.63	77.36	87.50
1 BN 06 REGT	66.15	68.00	53.33	73.75	53.33	61.33	58.26	81.82
2 BN 06 REGT	67.35	72.86	52.00	77.50	86.67	40.00	56.92	66.67
3 BN 06 REGT	74.88	66.40	25.00	43.33	63.33	45.71	44.17	66.67
4 BN 06 REGT	72.22	72.41	80.00	70.00	63.33	54.29	54.12	75.00
INF BN AVERAGE	78.62	74.78	69.57	59.00	70.08	56.47	64.30	76.59

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51 REGIMENT 1 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
<b>REGT HQ RATINGS</b>								
51 REGT	92.73	87.50	100.00	86.67	80.00	90.00	94.78	92.00
<b>INF BN RATINGS</b>								
1 BN 51 REGT	85.00	88.00	86.67	82.67	83.33	70.83	87.22	86.96
2 BN 51 REGT	84.91	88.39	74.29	68.00	83.33	76.92	85.41	93.33
3 BN 51 REGT	96.86	94.19	100.00	85.45	100.00	88.80	92.31	90.83
4 BN 51 REGT	83.85	79.39	65.71	74.67	81.67	53.68	80.00	85.00
INF BN AVERAGE	87.65	87.49	81.67	77.70	87.08	72.56	86.23	89.03

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## 22 DIVISION 2 CURPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	CUMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	71.58	64.29	85.00	73.33	60.00	42.50	63.33	80.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
40 REGT	90.34	82.11	91.43	95.00	86.67	46.00	82.86	93.33
41 REGT	80.00	76.67	88.57	85.00	80.00	26.00	69.57	87.78
47 REGT	82.67	52.86	100.00	85.00	80.00	38.00	60.00	76.67
REGT HQ AVG	84.34	70.54	93.33	88.33	82.22	36.67	70.81	85.93

## INF BN RATINGS

1 BN 40 REGT	91.54	88.89	100.00	85.00	100.00	53.13	86.07	90.83
2 BN 40 REGT	91.15	90.00	65.00	100.00	98.33	45.63	79.66	93.33
3 BN 40 REGT	91.15	90.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	50.97	82.07	90.83
4 BN 40 REGT	94.62	93.94	100.00	100.00	100.00	73.75	89.31	97.50
1 BN 41 REGT	85.96	77.42	87.50	55.00	86.67	54.29	68.33	88.89
2 BN 41 REGT	77.78	87.41	100.00	50.91	68.89	36.19	85.00	80.00
3 BN 41 REGT	73.64	79.31	77.50	52.00	93.33	52.00	72.35	80.00
4 BN 41 REGT	72.73	78.82	85.00	55.00	94.29	29.09	65.71	71.11
1 BN 47 REGT	68.00	74.74	100.00	82.86	67.50	0.00	76.25	75.38
2 BN 47 REGT	78.64	72.59	68.00	60.00	80.00	57.39	72.94	80.00
3 BN 47 REGT	78.82	65.63	90.00	60.00	81.67	66.88	70.33	81.82
4 BN 47 REGT	87.32	78.00	80.00	100.00	85.00	57.78	85.88	86.32
INF BN AVERAGE	82.61	81.40	87.75	75.06	87.97	48.09	77.83	84.67

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## 23 DIVISION 2 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	74.40	67.06	93.33	73.33	60.00	62.22	77.84	74.12

## REGT HQ RATINGS

44 REGT	72.86	89.09	85.00	80.00	80.00	52.00	74.62	58.00
45 REGT	96.92	83.64	100.00	93.33	100.00	96.00	100.00	96.00
53 REGT	90.00	83.64	100.00	86.67	70.00	43.33	66.67	92.00
REGT HQ AVG	86.59	85.45	95.00	86.67	83.33	63.78	80.43	82.00

## INF BN RATINGS

1 BN 44 REGT	62.86	84.44	85.00	100.00	83.33	53.33	73.85	55.00
2 BN 44 REGT	63.57	85.56	85.00	100.00	83.33	52.00	71.54	59.17
3 BN 44 REGT	62.50	84.44	82.50	96.00	83.33	53.33	71.54	55.83
4 BN 44 REGT	61.48	81.11	85.00	100.00	83.33	53.33	72.31	53.33
1 BN 45 REGT	96.15	88.24	100.00	97.14	90.00	83.75	99.31	88.33
2 BN 45 REGT	94.07	87.22	100.00	82.86	95.00	90.00	99.66	93.33
3 BN 45 REGT	96.43	86.67	95.00	77.50	100.00	86.25	80.71	88.33
4 BN 45 REGT	97.78	90.00	100.00	82.86	100.00	90.67	100.00	96.67
1 BN 53 REGT	83.08	80.00	95.00	97.14	80.00	73.75	75.00	73.33
2 BN 53 REGT	90.09	83.33	95.00	94.29	86.67	75.00	76.67	88.33
3 BN 53 REGT	96.67	97.78	95.00	97.14	100.00	95.00	92.67	98.33
4 BN 53 REGT	78.46	80.00	100.00	94.29	86.67	72.00	71.03	73.33
INF BN AVERAGE	81.92	85.73	93.12	93.27	89.31	73.20	82.02	76.94

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**42 REGIMENT 2 CORPS**

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
<b>REGT HQ RATINGS</b>								
42 REGT	90.71	69.09	97.50	88.00	85.00	55.00	68.97	87.00
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 42 REGT	75.36	78.33	100.00	94.29	90.00	71.88	75.33	69.17
2 BN 42 REGT	74.17	72.73	90.00	90.00	83.33	57.33	65.60	65.22
3 BN 42 REGT	72.86	95.00	95.00	96.67	93.33	57.42	64.14	63.33
4 BN 42 REGT	84.29	71.76	87.50	100.00	83.33	64.52	66.79	83.33
INF BN AVERAGE	76.67	74.46	93.12	95.24	87.50	62.79	67.96	70.26

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05 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	UPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	82.22	78.10	96.67	83.33	70.00	68.57	75.38	82.11

REGT HQ RATINGS

07 REGT	84.55	85.71	80.00	76.00	80.00	58.33	71.11	84.62
08 REGT	97.93	92.73	90.00	93.33	65.00	61.67	86.33	94.00
09 REGT	92.00	72.38	100.00	86.67	70.00	57.18	69.26	86.00
REGT HQ AVG	91.49	63.61	90.00	85.33	71.67	59.26	75.57	88.21

INF BN RATINGS

1 BN 07 REGT	74.78	81.67	75.00	96.67	70.00	51.61	66.92	71.00
2 BN 07 REGT	78.92	81.76	71.50	96.67	75.00	61.94	65.22	78.95
3 BN 07 REGT	82.55	85.56	75.00	91.67	78.33	58.71	66.54	77.89
4 BN 07 REGT	84.17	83.89	100.00	86.67	95.00	66.45	75.83	81.00
1 BN 08 REGT	90.00	87.22	100.00	90.00	76.67	73.75	70.77	90.00
2 BN 08 REGT	83.02	85.56	85.00	90.00	61.67	57.50	68.36	77.50
3 BN 08 REGT	94.55	88.33	93.33	96.67	81.67	68.75	77.82	93.33
4 BN 08 REGT	76.73	80.56	75.00	93.33	60.00	52.50	62.07	71.67
1 BN 09 REGT	91.38	85.00	100.00	96.67	95.00	82.50	95.67	92.50
2 BN 09 REGT	86.79	85.00	100.00	96.67	88.33	85.63	86.67	89.57
3 BN 09 REGT	88.93	82.22	100.00	96.67	83.33	57.50	68.28	79.17
4 BN 09 REGT	73.57	80.56	95.00	93.33	63.33	51.25	64.64	70.00
INF BN AVERAGE	83.78	83.94	89.65	93.75	77.36	64.01	72.40	81.05

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## 18 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
Div HQ Rating	89.29	75.24	96.67	83.33	80.00	60.00	77.69	83.16
<b>REGT HQ RATINGS</b>								
43 REGT	94.29	75.24	100.00	86.67	85.00	56.67	81.67	85.00
48 REGT	93.33	79.09	97.50	86.67	80.00	63.33	81.69	89.00
52 REGT	94.29	79.09	92.50	86.67	80.00	58.33	77.24	87.00
REGT HQ AVG	93.97	77.81	96.67	86.67	81.67	59.44	80.20	87.00
<b>INF BN RATINGS</b>								
1 BN 43 REGT	91.79	84.24	100.00	91.11	96.67	56.88	85.20	88.33
2 BN 43 REGT	90.18	79.41	90.00	61.18	88.33	72.50	75.92	81.67
3 BN 43 REGT	77.25	74.19	85.71	73.75	68.33	49.03	62.86	70.00
4 BN 43 REGT	73.21	72.57	87.50	54.29	65.00	46.88	56.79	66.67
1 BN 48 REGT	94.62	84.12	85.00	90.00	88.33	72.86	82.91	93.33
2 BN 48 REGT	87.55	79.35	85.00	72.00	71.67	71.61	71.53	90.83
3 BN 48 REGT	78.62	68.24	75.00	72.94	85.00	74.67	38.46	70.00
4 BN 48 REGT	77.74	82.67	100.00	66.67	84.00	41.67	65.71	86.67
1 BN 52 REGT	85.42	76.67	80.00	67.69	83.33	63.75	81.38	86.67
2 BN 52 REGT	83.91	74.00	80.00	82.00	83.33	63.75	73.20	84.76
3 BN 52 REGT	96.40	82.35	88.00	82.00	96.00	70.00	80.00	93.33
4 BN 52 REGT	70.37	66.67	86.67	89.09	63.33	55.00	63.10	69.17
INF 3N AVERAGE	83.92	77.04	86.91	75.23	81.11	61.55	69.75	81.79

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## 25 DIVISION 3 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAINING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	88.15	73.00	90.00	83.33	75.00	68.00	80.00	87.37
REGT HQ RATINGS								
46 REGT	93.60	80.00	95.00	86.67	70.00	60.00	88.33	92.00
49 REGT	94.00	77.14	80.00	76.67	70.00	51.11	82.08	87.00
50 REGT	92.86	74.55	90.00	85.00	60.00	65.00	78.55	90.00
REGT HQ AVG	93.49	77.23	88.33	82.78	73.33	58.70	82.99	89.67
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 46 REGT	88.00	88.24	95.00	77.50	91.43	58.62	80.00	78.33
2 BN 46 REGT	88.36	83.87	100.00	100.00	78.33	66.21	73.33	90.00
3 BN 46 REGT	93.08	86.67	96.67	88.00	98.33	75.00	76.67	94.17
4 BN 46 REGT	89.26	88.33	85.00	88.00	98.33	70.63	82.80	86.67
1 BN 49 REGT	82.22	82.78	90.00	69.09	73.33	50.32	62.61	76.67
2 BN 49 REGT	80.00	80.56	82.50	85.71	73.33	51.25	65.22	80.00
3 BN 49 REGT	87.78	84.44	85.00	75.56	83.33	61.88	79.13	77.50
4 BN 49 REGT	92.59	87.22	85.00	58.18	96.67	76.25	93.04	93.33
1 BN 50 REGT	86.55	80.59	82.50	75.00	85.00	72.26	74.14	82.50
2 BN 50 REGT	88.21	77.22	87.50	92.00	86.67	74.67	75.85	85.00
3 BN 50 REGT	68.85	76.97	80.00	70.00	78.33	64.80	71.37	65.83
4 BN 50 REGT	84.00	80.63	95.00	100.00	80.00	70.00	76.61	82.50
INF BN AVERAGE	85.74	83.13	88.68	81.59	85.26	65.99	75.99	82.71

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INF BN RATINGS

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## 07 DIVISION 4 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	74.29	70.91	86.67	73.33	90.00	38.33	75.24	76.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
10 REGT	85.71	64.76	80.00	73.33	70.00	61.82	75.63	83.16
11 REGT	71.54	67.62	60.00	76.67	65.00	34.55	66.00	60.00
12 REGT	82.67	71.58	84.00	76.67	95.00	25.45	65.71	74.44
REGT HQ AVG	79.97	67.99	74.67	75.56	76.67	40.61	69.11	72.53
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 10 REGT	78.91	80.63	55.00	95.00	81.67	60.00	69.12	78.33
2 BN 10 REGT	84.00	80.65	67.50	85.00	88.33	64.35	71.56	77.50
3 BN 10 REGT	85.00	81.76	70.00	91.67	85.00	74.38	75.00	80.83
4 BN 10 REGT	93.08	83.75	80.00	96.67	83.33	78.67	83.73	92.17
1 BN 11 REGT	70.45	66.47	60.00	85.00	77.78	35.56	57.69	48.00
2 BN 11 REGT	72.44	79.41	60.00	85.00	77.78	38.52	66.15	68.57
3 BN 11 REGT	64.44	68.24	53.33	85.00	73.33	32.00	51.85	49.52
4 BN 11 REGT	80.44	78.24	66.67	85.00	75.56	36.30	66.67	80.95
1 BN 12 REGT	75.93	81.33	93.33	82.50	91.11	45.71	68.00	74.55
2 BN 12 REGT	86.96	81.54	93.33	78.46	88.00	37.50	73.95	81.74
3 BN 12 REGT	69.06	72.90	77.50	68.33	84.00	28.18	65.56	71.43
4 BN 12 REGT	75.51	75.29	100.00	80.00	93.33	46.15	67.57	77.89
INF BN AVERAGE	78.02	77.52	73.06	84.80	83.27	48.11	68.07	73.46

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## 09 DIVISION 4 CURPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MURALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAINING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	86.90	61.82	92.50	86.67	80.00	58.00	81.74	82.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
14 REGT	89.63	64.55	91.43	90.00	85.00	60.00	76.89	76.00
15 REGT	86.67	65.45	92.50	80.00	75.00	63.33	76.52	87.00
16 REGT	87.33	64.55	92.00	80.00	75.00	57.78	74.47	80.00
REGT HQ AVG	87.88	64.85	91.98	83.33	78.33	60.37	75.96	81.00
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 14 REGT	84.55	65.81	88.57	98.00	78.18	35.65	54.29	65.88
2 BN 14 REGT	85.58	67.88	80.00	98.57	86.67	60.00	61.14	72.94
3 BN 14 REGT	83.56	70.30	82.86	97.14	81.14	65.00	77.39	80.00
4 BN 14 REGT	84.76	74.38	80.00	98.33	81.67	67.37	69.09	70.59
1 BN 15 REGT	92.24	84.38	100.00	90.00	93.33	62.50	85.12	87.50
2 BN 15 REGT	84.07	79.41	85.00	85.71	80.00	50.63	67.50	81.67
3 BN 15 REGT	87.78	76.47	85.00	82.86	93.33	60.00	78.75	90.00
4 BN 15 REGT	82.69	76.47	90.00	91.43	76.67	62.67	72.92	88.33
1 BN 16 REGT	86.07	84.85	85.00	100.00	80.00	64.00	77.45	89.57
2 BN 16 REGT	86.54	85.00	80.00	94.29	80.00	64.00	78.26	90.43
3 BN 16 REGT	76.15	80.00	80.00	94.29	80.00	64.00	79.15	79.13
4 BN 16 REGT	86.07	85.00	94.29	80.00	64.00	77.45	90.43	
INF BN AVERAGE	85.01	77.49	85.12	93.74	82.63	59.98	73.21	82.21

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## 21 DIVISION 4 CORPS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN-ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
DIV HQ RATING	89.33	62.73	87.50	86.67	80.00	46.67	84.48	85.00
REGT HQ RATINGS								
31 REGT	91.11	50.48	93.33	86.67	85.00	36.00	71.00	73.68
32 REGT	93.85	77.00	93.33	86.67	90.00	64.00	85.00	92.00
33 REGT	82.96	50.00	50.00	66.67	80.00	56.00	78.33	70.00
REGT HQ AVG	89.31	59.16	78.89	80.00	85.00	52.00	78.11	78.56
INF BN RATINGS								
1 BN 31 REGT	75.64	64.52	97.14	100.00	76.67	41.43	70.63	65.00
2 BN 31 REGT	79.26	61.25	100.00	100.00	76.67	42.86	70.00	67.00
3 BN 31 REGT	79.64	61.25	100.00	100.00	76.67	42.86	70.00	67.00
4 BN 31 REGT	75.64	61.82	97.14	100.00	76.67	43.08	70.63	65.00
1 BN 32 REGT	91.02	90.30	95.00	82.86	90.00	55.71	76.17	95.83
2 BN 32 REGT	91.02	88.13	60.00	84.29	85.00	55.71	79.26	90.00
3 BN 32 REGT	NO QUESTIONNAIRE RECEIVED							
4 BN 32 REGT	88.33	86.25	53.33	85.71	83.33	55.71	78.87	90.00
1 BN 33 REGT	86.04	91.20	100.00	85.33	83.64	76.00	66.25	85.83
2 BN 33 REGT	84.44	77.14	80.00	84.00	83.33	64.71	66.52	78.33
3 BN 33 REGT	84.29	77.14	95.00	90.00	86.67	40.71	73.64	83.64
4 BN 33 REGT	94.81	76.00	93.33	91.43	90.00	60.00	83.48	91.67
INF BN AVERAGE	84.56	75.91	88.27	91.24	82.60	52.62	73.22	79.94

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**AIRBORNE DIVISION**

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MURALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
01 ABN BN	90.74	84.29	0.00	75.00	96.36	72.50	73.95	87.50
02 ABN BN	89.26	90.63	100.00	86.67	91.67	60.65	80.48	90.00
03 ABN BN	97.78	88.33	100.00	82.50	98.33	86.36	89.30	100.00
05 ABN BN	85.28	90.37	100.00	91.67	93.33	69.29	77.73	87.50
06 ABN BN	87.04	85.71	0.00	91.67	85.00	56.43	70.43	85.00
07 ABN BN	93.70	93.57	100.00	93.33	90.00	74.67	80.00	95.00
08 ABN BN	96.67	91.33	100.00	93.33	100.00	71.54	81.86	94.17
09 ABN BN	69.63	83.70	100.00	88.33	85.00	57.14	70.43	72.50
11 ABN BN	78.89	86.21	100.00	96.00	88.33	63.08	68.89	76.67
AVERAGE	87.67	88.24	77.78	88.72	92.00	67.96	77.01	87.59

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## MARINE DIVISION

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
01 VM BN	92.31	91.11	83.33	82.67	95.00	75.63	87.20	93.33
02 VM BN	94.72	86.11	93.33	85.71	85.00	76.88	84.00	93.33
03 VM BN	96.92	88.89	80.00	77.14	73.33	68.39	81.20	96.67
04 VM BN	91.84	86.00	73.33	90.00	91.11	77.65	85.00	96.00
05 VM BN	92.33	84.12	70.00	98.33	91.11	65.56	86.98	90.43
06 VM BN	89.62	91.11	90.00	83.33	76.67	66.25	80.40	91.67
07 VM BN	95.38	87.22	86.67	85.71	80.00	75.00	83.46	93.33
AVERAGE	93.45	87.79	82.38	86.13	84.60	72.19	84.03	93.54

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RANGERS

	ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
11	RN BN	97.04	85.33	100.00	84.44	93.33	69.33	92.31	98.33
21	RN BN	65.09	78.29	51.43	63.33	73.33	40.00	65.58	65.22
22	RN BN	97.04	81.25	100.00	85.00	93.33	66.25	92.31	98.33
23	RN BN	100.00	77.14	100.00	98.00	92.00	78.67	84.21	96.36
30	RN BN	87.78	78.82	90.00	89.09	80.00	66.00	76.80	75.00
31	RN BN	90.00	88.57	100.00	20.00	75.00	60.00	81.50	91.11
32	RN BN	72.00	77.78	75.00	78.00	73.33	78.75	70.00	71.67
33	RN BN	79.58	76.67	90.00	92.00	82.50	52.41	72.08	78.18
34	RN BN	99.64	92.26	100.00	97.14	98.33	85.00	97.50	98.33
35	RN BN	96.92	91.25	100.00	65.71	85.00	86.25	95.00	96.67
36	RN BN	84.81	89.14	93.33	90.00	67.50	66.25	80.00	81.67
37	RN BN	73.57	75.56	57.50	66.67	73.33	42.86	63.33	70.00
38	RN BN	80.00	74.00	72.00	85.67	63.33	58.67	58.75	70.83
39	RN BN	91.11	75.56	40.00	58.57	90.00	50.67	76.67	89.17
41	RN BN	52.31	70.00	65.00	83.33	66.67	22.22	47.14	55.83
42	RN BN	86.67	83.53	100.00	57.14	93.33	61.25	72.00	85.00
43	RN BN	98.52	83.33	100.00	100.00	90.00	100.00	95.67	98.18
44	RN BN	70.34	82.67	85.00	68.57	93.33	46.25	60.00	70.00
51	RN BN	93.57	92.12	94.29	84.00	83.33	87.50	94.23	93.33
52	RN BN	82.50	82.67	95.00	90.00	72.73	50.40	67.37	72.00
	AVERAGE	84.92	81.80	85.43	77.88	81.99	63.44	77.18	82.76

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## ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRONS

ORGANIZATION	OPER- EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
01 CAV SQ	83.64	86.67	100.00	93.85	83.33	57.50	77.08	88.33
02 CAV SQ	91.38	86.11	97.50	87.69	90.00	70.00	85.66	88.33
03 CAV SQ	92.40	86.25	91.43	82.86	87.50	61.25	79.60	92.50
04 CAV SQ	83.86	87.27	85.00	74.29	85.45	84.14	73.70	83.33
05 CAV SQ	83.57	83.53	85.00	90.00	83.33	57.14	72.41	80.00
06 CAV SQ	77.36	78.46	90.00	62.83	75.00	43.16	74.48	89.17
07 CAV SQ	93.10	87.78	90.00	93.33	84.00	77.50	90.00	88.33
08 CAV SQ	70.00	74.12	80.00	90.00	76.67	61.94	62.00	61.67
09 CAV SQ	55.45	62.00	80.00	91.11	72.00	43.16	62.22	56.00
10 CAV SQ	76.47	87.86	86.67	83.33	70.00	57.27	67.84	80.00
11 CAV SQ	68.00	81.43	70.00	100.00	95.00	44.62	58.26	68.33
12 CAV SQ	69.63	82.35	77.14	68.57	83.33	58.75	71.38	72.50
14 CAV SQ	93.85	93.33	100.00	100.00	90.00	80.00	78.79	87.37
15 CAV SQ	69.70	71.82	70.00	90.00	62.86	37.50	56.00	66.67
16 CAV SQ	74.07	66.67	65.00	72.31	78.33	28.75	47.33	75.83
17 CAV SQ	81.43	83.57	66.67	72.86	80.00	52.31	60.00	85.22
18 CAV SQ	80.00	80.77	100.00	100.00	100.00	40.00	82.40	83.53
AVERAGE	79.05	81.18	84.38	85.47	82.17	56.18	70.54	79.24

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AIRBORNE & MARINE ARTILLERY

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
1 ABN ARTY	94.78	89.29			90.00	72.00	88.75	100.00
2 ABN ARTY	94.78	89.29			90.00	74.00	95.00	97.89
3 ABN ARTY	94.78	89.29			90.00	74.00	96.25	97.89
1 MAR ARTY	90.00	87.65			95.00	79.00	96.25	100.00
2 MAR ARTY	86.09	89.41			98.33	72.00	88.75	96.00
3 MAR ARTY	93.91	88.24			100.00	90.53	100.00	100.00
4BN/MAR ARTY AVG	92.39	88.86			93.89	76.92	94.17	98.63

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## ARTILLERY BATTALIONS

ORGANIZATION	OPER EFFECT	PERS/ MORALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
<b>1 CORPS</b>								
011 ARTY BN	96.52	87.14			93.33	74.00	77.50	96.00
012 ARTY BN	96.52	87.14			93.33	74.00	77.50	96.00
014 ARTY BN	93.33	86.36			80.00	63.16	73.85	92.94
021 ARTY BN	72.31	79.20			74.55	60.00	65.71	84.00
022 ARTY BN	71.00	79.20			74.55	60.00	68.57	81.33
030 ARTY BN	70.50	78.40			74.55	60.00	68.57	80.00
034 ARTY BN	95.65	87.14			90.00	66.00	71.43	96.00
044 ARTY BN	85.26	80.00			80.00	80.00	84.00	84.44
062 ARTY BN	91.30	88.15			86.67	64.00	72.50	94.00
064 ARTY BN	83.53	77.50			80.00	80.00	84.00	82.50
1 CORPS ARTY AVG	84.79	83.02			82.69	68.12	74.36	88.72
<b>2 CORPS</b>								
039 ARTY BN	90.00	94.29			86.67	86.67	82.50	100.00
063 ARTY BN	77.73	84.83			93.33	62.11	67.14	90.53
222 ARTY BN	89.09	78.46			88.00	40.00	65.71	74.00
223 ARTY BN	84.55	83.33			80.00	60.00	80.00	83.00
231 ARTY BN	89.52	92.86			86.67	87.50	100.00	98.00
232 ARTY BN	90.48	92.86			92.00	85.00	95.00	98.00
233 ARTY BN	87.62	96.67			84.00	82.50	100.00	98.00
2 CORPS ARTY AVG	87.00	89.04			87.24	71.97	84.34	91.65

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ORGANIZATION	OPER- EFFECT	PERS/ MURALE	CIVIL AFFAIR	COMBAT SPT	SUPPLY MAINT	TRAIN- ING	CMD & STAFF	LEADER SHIP
<b>3 CURPS</b>								
032 ARTY BN	68.89	77.33		60.00	55.00	60.00	55.56	
035 ARTY BN	74.55	86.88		83.33	67.50	72.50	81.11	
038 ARTY BN	93.91	93.75		100.00	90.00	100.00	96.00	
046 ARTY BN	85.45	88.75		86.67	86.00	94.29	92.00	
051 ARTY BN	88.70	89.38		80.00	70.00	82.86	96.00	
052 ARTY BN	88.70	89.38		80.00	70.00	82.86	96.00	
053 ARTY BN	88.70	89.38		80.00	70.00	82.86	96.00	
061 ARTY BN	88.70	95.00		93.33	82.00	90.00	94.00	
181 ARTY BN	75.22	78.62		70.00	60.00	68.75	73.00	
182 ARTY BN	81.82	85.52		80.00	67.00	78.75	88.89	
183 ARTY BN	78.64	90.63		73.33	64.00	75.00	71.11	
251 ARTY BN	89.57	89.38		83.33	82.00	85.00	91.00	
252 ARTY BN	89.57	89.38		83.33	82.00	85.00	91.00	
253 ARTY BN	90.00	88.75		83.33	82.00	85.00	91.00	
<b>3 CORPS ARTY AVG</b>	<b>84.46</b>	<b>88.01</b>		<b>81.19</b>	<b>73.39</b>	<b>81.63</b>	<b>86.62</b>	
<b>4 CURPS</b>								
031 ARTY BN	76.36	86.67		66.67	68.57	75.00	86.00	
033 ARTY BN	73.91	84.29		80.00	50.00	88.57	88.00	
036 ARTY BN	79.95	87.14		100.00	91.43	100.00	97.78	
047 ARTY BN	67.27	76.25		76.67	40.00	46.67	73.33	
067 ARTY BN	69.55	75.38		84.00	57.78	77.50	69.00	
068 ARTY BN	74.29	66.67		72.00	60.00	70.00	84.00	
071 ARTY BN	72.44	83.75		93.33	41.18	50.00	87.00	
072 ARTY BN	71.16	81.82		90.00	36.00	56.25	87.00	
073 ARTY BN	68.18	74.67		85.00	46.00	58.75	77.00	
091 ARTY BN	89.52	95.29		96.67	70.00	91.43	98.00	
092 ARTY BN	81.36	81.76		76.67	53.68	72.50	85.00	
093 ARTY BN	83.64	82.35		76.67	50.00	83.33	91.00	
211 ARTY BN	76.09	81.25		76.67	70.00	91.25	84.00	
212 ARTY BN	81.74	90.59		76.67	80.00	77.50	99.00	
213 ARTY BN	90.00	84.38		86.67	72.00	87.50	91.00	
<b>4 CORPS ARTY AVG</b>	<b>76.96</b>	<b>82.15</b>		<b>82.49</b>	<b>59.11</b>	<b>75.08</b>	<b>86.47</b>	

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ANNEX E

Combat Support Received

This annex presents the totals of various types of combat support received by maneuver battalions, as reported by battalion advisors. Also presented is the "per battalion share", or the total for the major organization divided by the number of maneuver battalions in that organization.

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ORGANIZATION	COMBAT SUPPORT RECEIVED 1ST QTR CY 70						HEL MED EVAC SORTIES	AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES
	ARTY ROUNDS	NAVAL GUNFIRE ROUNDS	HEL GUNSHIP SORTIES	FXD WING GUNSHIP SORTIES	TAC AIR SORTIES	HEL LIFT SORTIES		
1st DIV	55,860	1,520	259	6	142	1,758	0	202
2d DIV	22,020	0	442	7	97	2,896	0	152
51st REGT	6,060	0	12	2	34	184	0	79
I CORPS	83,940	1,520	713	15	273	4,838	0	433
22d DIV	9,490	40	220	8	23	1,175	0	128
23d DIV	13,940	0	102	4	54	511	0	51
42d REGT	4,850	0	39	2	9	569	8	26
II CORPS	28,280	40	361	14	86	2,255	8	205
5th DIV	33,730	0	459	10	202	2,069	0	177
13th DIV	17,120	0	172	101	29	1,940	0	66
25th DIV	10,910	0	1,352	2	39	6,099	0	233
III CORPS	61,760	0	1,983	113	270	10,108	0	476
7th DIV	25,880	0	413	8	10	4,002	0	303
9th DIV	45,000	0	1,020	61	27	7,757	6	420
21st DIV	37,820	420	565	46	158	2,541	0	166
IV CORPS	108,700	420	1,998	115	195	14,300	6	889
INF TOTAL	282,680	1,980	5,055	257	824	31,501	14	2,003
AB	63,370	30	1,065	12	871	3,945	17	219
CV	30,020	120	253	7	179	51	21	167
VNMC	23,200	0	290	67	26	3,727	0	365
RN	43,510	120	737	9	296	5,744	10	316
ARVN/VNMC/TOTAL	442,780	2,250	7,400	352	2,196	44,968	62	3,070
								7,902

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ORGANIZATION	ARTY ROUNDS	NAVAL GUNFIRE ROUNDS	HEL GUNSHIP SORTIES	COMBAT SUPPORT RECEIVED			PER BN 1ST QTR CY 70	AIR RESUPPLY SORTIES
				FXD WING GUNSHIP SORTIES	TAC AIR SORTIES	HEL LIFT SORTIES		
1st DIV	3,285.88	89.41	15.2	.3	8.3	103.4	.0	11.8
2d DIV	1,835.00	0	36.8	.5	8.6	241.3	.0	12.6
51st REGT	1,515.00	0	3.0	.5	8.5	46.0	.0	19.7
I CORPS	2,543.63	46.06	21.6	.4	8.2	146.6	.0	13.1
22d DIV	790.83	3.33	18.3	.6	1.9	97.9	.0	10.6
23d DIV	1,161.66	0	8.5	.3	4.5	42.5	.0	4.2
42d REGT	1,212.50	0	9.7	.5	2.2	142.2	2.0	6.5
II CORPS	1,019.00	1.42	12.8	.5	3.0	80.5	.2	7.3
5th DIV	2,810.83	0	38.2	.9	16.8	172.4	.0	14.7
18th DIV	1,388.10	0	13.9	8.1	2.3	157.2	.0	5.3
25th DIV	909.16	0	112.6	.1	3.2	508.2	.0	19.4
III CORPS	1,699.81	0	54.5	3.1	7.4	305.0	.0	14.3
7th DIV	2,156.66	0	34.4	.6	.8	333.5	.0	25.2
9th DIV	3,750.00	0	85.0	5.0	2.2	646.4	.5	35.0
21st DIV	3,151.66	35.00	47.0	3.8	13.1	211.7	.0	13.8
IV CORPS	3,019.44	11.66	55.0	3.1	5.4	397.2	.1	24.6
INF TOTAL	2,120.10	14.85	37.9	1.9	6.1	236.2	.1	15.0
AB	7,041.11	3.33	118.3	1.3	96.7	438.3	1.8	24.3
CV	1,699.24	6.79	14.3	.3	10.1	2.8	1.1	9.4
VNMC	3,480.00	0	43.5	10.0	3.9	559.0	0.0	54.7
RN	2,212.37	6.10	37.4	.4	15.0	292.0	.5	16.0
ARVN/VNMC/TOTAL	2,376.27	12.07	39.7	1.8	11.7	241.3	.3	16.4

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